This Domain is for Sale      


What's New
Lies or Laws?

This page contains answers to common questions handled by our support staff, along with some tips and tricks that we have found useful and presented here as questions.


What is Pro se ?

IN PROPRIA PERSONA - Lat. "In ones own proper person" To represent ones 
self in court without assistance of an attorney.
The United States Supreme Court recently observed in its unanimous 
decision in Kay v. Ehrler, supra, 499 U.S. 432, that a lawmaking body 
may instead prefer to discourage attorneys from electing to appear in 
propria persona because such self-representation may often conflict with 
the general public and legislative policy favoring the effective and 
successful prosecution of meritorious claims. The high court observed 
that "Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage 
in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it 
inappropriate for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of the 
judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the 
case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-
examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making 
sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical 
response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The adage that 'a 
lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client' is the product of 
years of experience by seasoned litigators." Id. at 437-438 
In his own person. It is a rule in pleading that pleas to the 
jurisdiction of the court must be pleaded in propria persona, because, 
if pleaded by attorney, they admit the jurisdiction, as an attorney is 
an officer of the court, and he is presumed to plead after having 
obtained leave, which admits the jurisdiction.
   An appearance may be in propria persona, and need not be by attorney. 
Back to Top


Police force ?

Understanding the Use of Force By and Against the Police.
Series: NIJ Research in Brief
Published: November 1996
15 pages
30,224 bytes
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
National Institute of Justice
Research in Brief
Jeremy Travis, Director
November 1996
Figures, charts, forms, and tables are not included
in this ASCII plain-text file. To view this
document in its entirety, download the Adobe
Acrobat graphic file available from this web site
or order a print copy from NCJRS at 800-851-3420.
Understanding the Use of Force By and Against the
Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Brief: An NIJ-sponsored study of
1,585 adult custody arrests in Phoenix, Arizona,
the eighth largest city in the United States, to
determine the use of force both by and against the
Key issues: The research conducted by Rutgers
University and Arizona State University was
prompted by a perceived need on the part of the
Phoenix Police Department and NIJ to gather
information about arrest situations, tactics,
policy, training, and practices. The study surveyed
police officers over a 2-week period in June 1994
and interviewed 185 suspects.
Key findings: Force was used infrequently by the
police and even less frequently by suspects.
Suspects interviewed reported levels of police
force similar to those obtained from officer self-
Among the other findings: 
o Police used some physical force in about one of
every five arrests. Suspects used some physical
force in about one of every six arrests.
o Phoenix police officers are required to restrain
only felony or belligerent suspects. In 20 percent
of all adult custody arrests studied, officers
opted to use no restraints.
o When force was used by the police or suspects, it
was typically at the low end of the severity scale.
o Weapons were used by the police in 2 percent of
all arrests. The weapon most frequently used by the
police was a flashlight (12 times in 1,585
o Of 41 factors examined, only 9 consistently
contributed to the prediction of police use of
o The single best predictor of police use of force
was suspect use of force.
o Two-thirds of the variation in the amount of
force used by police remains unexplained.
Target audience: Law enforcement policymakers,
practitioners, and police trainers
Understanding the Use of Force By and Against the
by Joel Garner, John Buchanan, Tom Schade, and John
The Phoenix Police Department, in conjunction with
Rutgers University and Arizona State University,
designed and implemented a study of the use of
force by and against Phoenix police officers.
Conducted during a 2-week period in June 1994, the
research was prompted by the need to generate
systematic information on the role of force in
arrest tactics policy, training, and practice. This
study, sponsored by the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), was concerned with determining the
characteristics of arrest situations, suspects, and
officers associated with the use of force, as well
as the amount of force actually used. 
Research results showed that, during the study
period, the Phoenix police employed some degree of
physical force in 22 percent of adult custody
arrests and that suspect use of physical force was
even less frequent. Further, in situations where
members of either group did employ force, the
levels typically were low. Despite a policy that
requires the routine use of restraints in arrests
of felons and belligerent suspects, officers did
not restrain suspects in one-fifth of all custody
arrests involving adults. Finally, a number of
factors--most notably, suspect use of force--were
found to predict police use of force (see exhibit
This Research in Brief explains the methodology
used to measure the use of force, discusses study
results, and presents the implications of these
findings for future policy and research.
Study method
The research was designed to address some of the
more important limitations of prior research on use
of force. First, measures were developed to capture
the range of force used within the Department's
standard force continuum. Measures of the simple
dichotomy between force and no force (or excessive
and reasonable force) neither capture the full
range of police or suspect behavior nor recognize
the great variety of force-related behavior in law
enforcement. Second, rather than focusing
exclusively on situations that involved severe uses
of force such as firearm discharges, serious
injuries, or deaths, data were collected from a
representative sample of arrests to permit
examination of the range of instances where some
degree of force could be used.
A third aim of the study was to determine the
correlates of force. Although helpful, descriptive
data on arrest situations or force levels do not
provide, by themselves, an appropriate basis for
developing arrest tactics training. Therefore,
researchers sought to understand the specific
circumstances and situations where more or less
force is used to accomplish an arrest and to use
that information to improve training and practice
in arrest tactics.
Obtaining the information. The primary source of
data was a one-page (front and back) survey
completed by Phoenix police officers after arrests
were made during a 2-week period in June 1994 (see
exhibit 2). This form was used to record specific
behavioral aspects of the arrests and gather
information on police mobilization, the nature of
the offense, and officer and suspect
From these surveys, detailed information was
compiled about the frequency of specific officer
and arrestee behaviors along five dimensions:
o Voice (officer/suspect spoke in a conversational
tone, articulated threats, issued commands,
shouted, or cursed).
o Motion (mode of officer pursuit/suspect flight).
o Restraints (mechanical devices used by police to
control arrestee, e.g., handcuffs, body cuffs,
o Weaponless tactics (officer/suspect grabbing,
twisting, pushing, shoving, punching, kicking,
biting, scratching, wrestling, scuffling, and use
of control holds or pressure points).
o Weapons (suspect possession or officer/suspect
threatened use, or actual use of martial arts or a
baton, flashlight, knife, blunt instrument,
chemical agent, canine, handgun, rifle, or shotgun;
includes use of a motor vehicle as a weapon).
The detailed survey responses were used to
construct three measures of force--physical force,
continuum of force, and maximum force. These
measures were designed to capture the full range of
force used, including low levels of force not
traditionally examined by police use-of-force
research. Multivariate statistical models also were
developed to evaluate the extent to which officer,
suspect, and arrest situation characteristics
consistently predicted the amount of force used.
The reliability of the police survey was assessed
by interviewing a sample of suspects booked in the
Maricopa County Jail; 185 interviews were matched
to officer surveys. Both the officer surveys and
suspect interviews were voluntary and anonymous.
Overview of survey results
Of the 1,777 surveys obtained during the 2-week
period covered by the study, 1,585 pertained to
adults who were booked by Phoenix police officers
at the Maricopa County Jail (noncustody and
juvenile arrests were excluded). The Department's
automated information system (PACE) recorded 1,826
arrests in which an adult suspect was booked. Thus,
surveys were obtained for more than 85 percent of
arrests involving detained adults.
The surveys revealed that, in making these 1,585
adult custody arrests, officers:
o Used threats or shouts less than 4 percent of the
o Pursued a fleeing suspect 7 percent of the time.
o Placed cuffs or restraints on 77 percent of the
o Used a weaponless tactic (holding, hitting, etc.)
in 17 percent of the arrests.
o Threatened to, but did not, use a weapon 3.7
percent of the time.
o Used a weapon in 2 percent of the arrests.
Surveyed officers also reported that the weapon
most frequently used by them against a suspect was
a flashlight (12 arrests). They also noted that no
restraints were used in 20 percent of the surveyed
cases (3 percent of completed surveys did not
indicate whether restraints were used). According
to survey data, use of force was reported rarely by
either police officers or suspects; when some form
of force was used, it was typically at the low end
of the study's measures.
The three measures of force
Physical force. "Physical force" was defined as
officer or suspect use of any weaponless tactic
(such as kicking or shoving) or the threatened or
actual use of any weapon. In addition, police use
of physical force included the application of
severe restraints, including cuffing suspects while
they were prone, hobbling (hog-tying a suspect's
legs), leg cuffing, and body restraint (e.g., a
straitjacket). The possibility that suspects would
use restraints on police officers was excluded from
consideration. Suspect possession of a weapon, even
if not used or threatened, was included as an
example of physical force by suspects. Officer
possession of a weapon was not considered use of
physical force by officers.
In 349 of the 1,585 surveyed arrests (22 percent),
the police reported using some form of physical
force. In nearly four out of every five adult
custody arrests, police officers used no physical
force at all. The surveys indicated that suspects
used physical force in 228 (14.4 percent) of the
1,585 incidents. In roughly five out of every six
adult arrests, suspects reportedly used no physical
Continuum of force. The study's second measure of
force was based on two six-step rankings used by
the Phoenix Police Department (see exhibit 3),
which are similar to those used in many other
jurisdictions to locate degrees of force in a
progression. The rankings are independent; a "3" on
the police scale (control and restraint) is not
necessarily equivalent to a "3" on the suspect
scale (passive resistance). The measurement of this
"continuum of force" was intended not only to
reflect the official policies of the Phoenix Police
Department but also to incorporate the widely held
notion that the force/no force dichotomy is
inadequate to capture all important variations in
the ways police handle encounters with the public.
Exhibits 4 and 5 show the highest level of force
used by police and suspects in terms of the force
continuum. In 918 (57.9 percent) arrests, the
highest level of force used by the police was some
form of restraint; in another 350 (22.1 percent),
no restraints were used. Chemical weapons were the
highest level of force employed by the police in 2
(.01 percent) arrests; although not discharged,
firearms were threatened or somehow used in 54 (3.4
percent) arrests. Other weapons and weaponless
tactics were used in 261 (16.5 percent) arrests.
In 977 (61.6 percent) arrests, suspects offered no
resistance to officers. In another 196 (12.4
percent), the forms of resistance were either
psychological or verbal. In 136 (almost 9 percent)
arrests, suspects used or threatened to use a
physical tactic or a weapon; in 11 (0.7 percent) of
those arrests, the weapon was a firearm (see
exhibit 5).
Maximum force. A measure of maximum force was
constructed by identifying the single most severe
use of force employed by the police, based on a
ranking of 80 different types of police statements,
physical restraints, tactics, and weapon use. These
rankings ranged on a scale of 0 to 100 (with 100
denoting maximum force). The severity of behaviors
was weighed according to the judgment of 11
experienced and currently active Phoenix patrol
officers, whose opinions were solicited for this
purpose. In a similar exercise, a measure of the
maximum amount of force used by suspects was
developed (see exhibits 6 and 7).
Suspects' views on use of force. In order to assess
the reliability of the study's force measures,
results of interviews with suspects from a sample
of 185 adults taken into custody during the 2-week
period were matched to corresponding police
surveys. Interviewers from Arizona State University
asked detainees about the force used by police in
the course of their arrests, as well as the force
that they themselves exhibited. The interviews
resulted in findings that were comparable to those
of the police surveys (see exhibit 8).
Influences on use of force
In addition to developing three measures of force,
the study team compiled detailed information on how
the police were mobilized, the nature of each
offense, the location of each offense, the personal
characteristics of officers, the personal
characteristics of suspects, and any associations
that could be made between police and suspect
characteristics. Information about each arrest was
collected on 41 specific items thought to influence
the use of force.
Analyses of these variables in relation to each
measure of force identified 16 consistent
nonpredictors, 16 inconsistent predictors, and 9
consistent predictors of force.
Consistent nonpredictors. More than one-third (16)
of the 41 factors examined did not predict any of
the three measures of police or suspect use of
force. These factors were:
Custody status of arrestee
Dispatch or on-view arrest
Night time
Weekend nights
Number of suspects at initial contact
Number of suspects at arrest completion
Victim and suspect friends or same family
Bystander and suspect friends or same family
Inside a residence
Location known for criminal activity
Number of arrests in past 30 days
Years since last training
Known to have criminal record
Given the size and representative nature of the
sample of adult arrests from which various measures
of potential predictors were obtained and the
strength of the multivariate analyses employed,
these findings of "no effect" cannot be attributed
to either the research design or its
implementation. Although generalization of these
findings awaits replication, future discussions of
police use-of-force policies and practices (and
designs for additional research on police use of
force) should consider this study's evidence that
these 16 factors consistently failed to predict
police or suspect use of force.
Inconsistent predictors. Sixteen of the 41 factors
considered in the study predicted only one or two
of the three measures of force used by and against
police. These factors retain their candidacy as
predictors of force and warrant inclusion in
subsequent research. Each predicted some measure of
force but failed to meet this study's conservative
standard of predicting all three measures.
In the following list of inconsistent predictors,
the minus (-) signs indicate a negative
relationship. Thus, as a predictor (such as
visibility) increases in value, the use of force
decreases. The negative sign on the race variable
is based on the finding that Hispanic suspects on
average use less force against the police than non-
Hispanic suspects. 
Patrol division (-)
Early, middle, or late phase of shift
Number of police at initial contact
Traffic offense
Property offense
Vice offense
Domestic call
Bystander's demeanor
Visibility (-)
Inside a nonresidential building (-)
Location known to be hazardous
Length of service
Past injury
Drug impaired
Race (-)
Because suspect use of force influences police use
of force, this list of inconsistent predictors
includes any factor that predicted one measure of
suspect use of force. For instance, prior injury to
an officer did not predict police use of force
directly, but it did predict one of the three
measures of suspect force. Similarly, the race of
officers and suspects played no role in predicting
police use of force, but because Hispanic suspects
used less force than other suspects on one measure,
race was listed as an inconsistent predictor of
Age is one of the most consistent predictors of
participation in and frequency of criminal
behavior, and we were surprised that age was not a
substantial and consistent predictor of the use of
force. In fact, at least one of the various
components of "age"--officer age, suspect age, and
the interaction of the two--was found to be
associated with all three measures of force
employed in the study, but the direction of the
effects changed with different measures and
Consistent predictors. The analyses identified nine
characteristics that consistently predicted police
use of force:
Use of contact and cover tactics
Increased number of police
Arrest for a violent offense
Presence of bystanders
Use of force
Gang involvement
Alcohol impairment
Known to be resistive, assaultive, or to carry a
Both male
Some predictors affected police use of force
directly; others affected it through their
influence on suspect use of force. Some
characteristics predicted both.
Among the predictors of police use of force,
suspect use of force had the largest impact on each
of the three measures of police use of force. This
remained true when controlling for the possibility
that some suspect use of force could be a reaction
to police use of force. This finding supports the
perspective that underlies use-of-force policies
and arrest tactics training in the Phoenix Police
Department and in many other departments around the
country: Police use force (and are authorized to do
so) in response to suspects' levels of resistance.
However, suspect use of force does not explain all
or even a large proportion of the variation in the
amount of force used by the police. This finding
supports the perspective that response to suspect
force, although significant, is not the only
situation in which the police use force (see
exhibit 1).
Implications of study findings
Policy implications. This research has specific
implications for police policy, training, and
practice in the use of force. First, it provides
systematic evidence that the use of force in
Phoenix is infrequent; when used, force was
typically at the lower end of the measures of
force. In addition, no evidence was found to show
that force was applied unevenly or in
discriminatory ways against racial minorities. 
The findings did raise some issues for further
consideration. For instance, the single most
frequent weapon used when arrests were made in
Phoenix was the flashlight. At the time of this
study (June 1994), the Phoenix Police Department's
arrest tactics training program provided limited
guidance regarding the use of a flashlight as a
weapon. Officers are currently receiving enhanced
training in the use of the flashlight as a weapon.
The same rules that apply to the use of batons
apply to flashlights.
A second area of concern is that the widely
promoted "contact-and-cover" tactic was
consistently associated in this study with
increased use of force. Contact and cover is a
tactic whereby one of two officers makes contact
with the suspect(s) or complaining citizen(s),
while the second officer takes a position a short
distance away to maintain a view of the entire
situation and "cover" the contact officer. No
assertion can be made on the basis of available
evidence that the use of this tactic caused the
police in Phoenix to use more force. However, the
research design included controls for some of the
characteristics of the arrest situation that might
lead officers to use contact and cover--suspect use
of force, violent offense, number of suspects and
bystanders, low visibility--but these
characteristics cannot explain the consistent
association between use of contact and cover and
all three measures of force. In addition, the
contact-and-cover tactic is intended to provide
officers with a tactical advantage should a
physical confrontation occur. That advantage, some
might assume, should reduce the amount of force
used by police and suspects, but no evidence was
found to support this assumption. A thorough
examination of all aspects of the use of contact
and cover, beginning with a more indepth review of
the data collected in this study, is recommended.
The third implication for policy stems from the
finding that the gender of the suspect and the
police officer directly affected the amount of
force used by the police. More force was used by
police when both officer and suspect were male than
when both officer and suspect were female or their
gender was unreported. However, male suspects were
not found to use more force against the police than
female suspects when all of the predictors were
considered. For most officers and researchers, this
is counterintuitive. Statistical controls for the
height and weight of officers and suspects, as well
as for the suspect's use of force, were included,
and these controls (or other factors not included
in the research) may account for the absence of an
effect for suspect sex on suspect use of force.
Since most arrests (1,059, or 67 percent) involved
a male officer and a male suspect, we interpreted
these findings to mean that arrests of female
suspects by female officers involved less force
than the typical arrest.
A fourth area of concern is use of restraints and
the possibility that Phoenix police officers are
using too little force when they make custody
arrests. In more than 20 percent of arrests, the
police officers asserted that they had used no
handcuffs or other restraints; in another 3 percent
of the arrests, this item was not filled in on the
officer survey. The available data do not provide a
basis for determining the soundness of the current
policy, which authorizes and encourages officers to
restrain any custody arrestee but requires them to
do so only with felons and belligerent suspects.
The concern is based on the seemingly high
frequency with which the discretion to not use
restraints is exercised.
The last issue raised by this research is the
generic and imprecise quality of some of the 12
categories of suspect resistance and officer
response that are central to the department's use-
of-force policies. Behavioral indicators for each
of these categories were developed, with
difficulty, and it is suspected that officers may
have similar problems determining whether, for
instance, flight in a 2,000-pound automobile
belongs in category 4, "defensive resistance," or
category 5, "active aggression." Similarly, the
policy groups together all weapons except chemical
agents and firearms, which are placed in separate
categories. We do not suggest the use of more than
six categories or the kind of detailed ranking
distinguishing weapon possession, threat, and use
that was helpful for this research. However, the
policy could be more clearly stated and the
relative rankings based more explicitly on the
relative severity of officer and suspect behaviors.
Finally, as new weapons and tactics become
available, the review of the continuum-of-force
categories is inevitable.
Research implications
We used a representative sample of police behavior,
developed a variety of measures of police and
suspect use of force, and employed explicit models
and appropriate multivariate statistical procedures
to assess the strength of individual predictors of
force. Previous research has not used these
standards, but future research could benefit from
using and improving on them.
The sampling was representative but not systematic.
We used one 2-week period in June 1994 and were
unable to discern if seasonal variation played a
role in the amount or distribution of force used.
Other sampling schemes need to be developed and
implemented that will provide a more formal
statistical basis from which to make inferences
about all arrests in a particular jurisdiction.
Data collection was anonymous, and understanding
the behavior of individual officers or suspects
over time was thus precluded. Anonymity also
complicated the matching of officer surveys and
suspect interviews. Federal protections of
research-subject confidentiality are strong, even
for police officers. Future research could attempt
to better integrate survey, interview, and official
records of police and suspect behavior.
The measures of force are improvements over simple
dichotomies of the past, but, as ordinal or
interval measures, they are simply illustrative. At
best, they should be early prototypes of
measurement models that reflect true scales or the
full extent of harm caused by different forceful
The data collection instrument included many items
thought to be important in the study of police use
of force. The length of the form was a burden to
participating police officers and reflected the
fact that the researchers could not match officer
responses to official records about the arrest, the
suspect's prior record, or the officer's career.
Improved data on weapon possession and use are
essential, and the sequencing of officer and
suspect behaviors should be a high priority in
future research.
The use of multivariate statistical models improved
the rigor of this study, but the available methods
were only a small subset of approaches to assessing
causal influences. Most police professionals and
researchers believe that community context is an
important consideration in how much force is used.
This research does not incorporate contextual
models to account for such influences.
Because this is only one study in one jurisdiction
at one point in time, the results may not
generalize to other jurisdictions and their
relationships between citizens and police. There is
no substitute for replication.
All prior assessments of police use of force that
employed a systematic sample of police behavior as
a foundation report that use of force is infrequent
and that many of the factors commonly thought to
influence it do not. Limitations in prior research
left the validity and reliability of those findings
uncertain. This research implemented a design to
overcome some of these limitations, and the
researchers reached the same conclusion: Using
three alternative measures of force, the survey of
adult custody arrests in Phoenix revealed that no
force, or only low levels of force, was used in a
large proportion of cases.
In addition, the results did not support the notion
that the race of officers or suspects directly or
indirectly affects the amount of force used in
adult custody arrests. The popular focus on racial
factors in use of force seems to be unsupported by
this study and other research evidence. Subsequent
research must be attentive to the low base rate for
use of force by police and the even lower base rate
by suspects.
On the other hand, official policy and training on
the use of force do not indicate an awareness of
the common absence of force. Recognition that force
is rare and, when used, varies along a continuum
has implications for law enforcement policy,
training, and street behavior.
Joel Garner, Research Director, the Joint Centers
for Justice Studies, was the principal investigator
for this study. John Buchanan, Commander, and
Richard Groeneveld, Lieutenant, Phoenix Police
Department, served as project director and deputy
project director, respectively. Co-principal
investigators included Thomas Schade and John
Hepburn of Arizona State University and Jeffrey
Fagan of Rutgers University.
This Research in Brief is based on the study
supported by award 92-IJ-CX-K028 from the National
Institute of Justice, the contributions of the
participating officers of the Phoenix Police
Department, and the assistance of the Maricopa
County Sheriff's Department.
The complete report is available through the
National Criminal Justice Reference Service on
interlibrary loan or, for a fee, photocopy
reproduction. Call 1-800-851-3420. Ask for NCJ
Dr. Garner discussed his work with an audience of
researchers and criminal justice professionals and
practitioners. A 60-minute videotape, Understanding
Use of Force, is also available for $19 ($24 in
Canada and other foreign countries). Ask for NCJ
Points of view expressed in this report are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
official position or policies of the Phoenix Police
Department, the Maricopa County Sheriff's
Department, or the U.S. Department of Justice.
The National Institute of Justice is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims
of Crime.
NCJ 158614


Back to Top


Laws of Oppression. ?

Laws as "Instruments of Oppression"
        "Laws as Instruments of Oppression"
        Abuses of "Antidrug Legislation", of "Money Laundering and Forfeiture 
        Laws. Human Rights Violations under "Color of Law", "Appearance of 
        Justice" and a facade of "Due Process".
  As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression. In both 
  instances, there's a twilight where everything remains seemingly unchanged, 
  and it is in such twilight that we must be aware of change in the air, however 
  slight, lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness.
            Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas
  Laws as Instruments of Oppression
  The Misapplication of the Money Laundering Laws
    An Example of Money Laundering Law Misapplication
  "Antidrug Legislation" - The Money Laundering Laws.
  The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 
  The Comprehensive Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
  The Money Laundering Control Amendments of 1988
  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
  The "Sting" Money Laundering Statute (18 U.S. Code, Section 1956 (a)(3)
  Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1956 - 1957- An Overview of The Money Laundering 
  The potential for abuse of the money laundering laws
  The Unconstitutionality of the Money Laundering "Sting" Statute, Title 18, 
  U.S. Code, Section 1956 (a)(3)
  Forfeiture Laws
  An Essay You Must Read About the "New Laws" and the Rape of our Constitution.
Laws as "Instruments of Oppression"
  Good laws should derive their authority from their adherence to natural laws, 
  and by common sense. A society needs good laws to fight crime and to protect 
  human rights. However, every government in history has manufactured certain 
  laws and punishments to coerce "obedience" from an "unwilling" population. 
  These laws, in their mature forms, always display one common characteristic, 
  unconscionably harsh penalties for alleged infractions committed. They possess 
  no intrinsic moral authority and the sole purpose of enforcement is the police 
  power of the government over peoples' private lives. Individual citizens, or 
  society in general, have no stake in and no commitment to such laws. Society 
  does not get any benefits from unreasonable prosecutions. In fact resources 
  and taxpayers' money are wasted.
  To keep the people entrapped and the facade of "justice", a maze' of 
  (so-called) victim-less crime laws have been imposed on Americans in recent 
  years. These liberty destroying oppressive laws control the enslaved victims 
  with the instilled fear of heavy fines, and imprisonment for acts that harm no 
  other individual.
  Through improper application of such "laws" and through abuse of the criminal 
  justice system, thousands of Americans have been deprived of their God-given 
  unaliable-right to freedom. Recently, improperly defined "laws" have been 
  enacted which are used to prosecute and convict targeted Americans and to 
  confiscate their property. Some of these new laws even permit prosecutors to 
  prearrange hypothetical thought crimes and evidence with guaranteed conviction 
  and level of sentencing. These new statutes have been turned into "instrument 
  of repression and oppression" that belong more appropriately in third world 
  countries that our Government accuses of human right violations. Human right 
  violations (well disguised certainly) occur with frequent regularity in our 
  own country. More and more frequently these new laws are improperly applied 
  against selectively targeted individuals. This signifies a trend which will 
  continue and will eventually encompass others. It is like an insidious virus 
  that has lied dormant and now is spreading and expanding in a geometric 
  progression. It is an early phase of fascism. 
  Legal fictions have been an accepted part of the common law tradition but 
  today, we have new and malignant fictions which are designed to evade the 
  evidence requirements of the Sixth Amendment in any legal proceeding. 
  Unfortunately a system such as this so violates the American spirit of fair 
  play that it brings the law and the process by which it is applied into 
  disrepute. The word "justice" no longer has a connotation of fairness. It has 
  a connotation of retribution and punishment.
  Punishement is as unfair as the misapplication of such laws. Now we have 
  justice by recipe in our country with handed down simplistic issues that are 
  cut and dry. Judges and prosecutors just open the cookbook of "justice" and 
  search for a credible offense or issue that can justify the government's 
  improper actions. They extrapolate here and interpolate there. And, thus, with 
  the impartial guidance of such cookbooks they arrive at decisions. These 
  cookbooks are called "Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines". Who would ever have 
  imagined that adjudication of "legal" matters in our country could be so easy? 
  Who would have ever thought that severe punishments would take place in our 
  country and that millions of Americans would be either in prison or under the 
  supervision of the courts? Who, indeed?
  Millions of people in our country are disenchanted with the way in which the 
  laws are being enforced. There is growing hostility, resentment and disrespect 
  for the injustices and the legal manipulation of the law by government agents 
  and prosecutors. So these draconian laws against citizens and minorities are 
  not simply unjust and unfair. They do more harm than good. They destroy 
  families, they destroy individuals, and they are doing a tremendous amount of 
  harm to our country. We have more people in prison in this country than any 
  other country in the world. Our government recently allocated billions of 
  taxpayers' money for more prisons, most of them to house "marginal offenders" 
  while , at the same time, trying to "balance" the federal budget.
  Government policies to fight the epidemic of drugs are failing. So called 
  anti-drug legislation and "money laundering laws" are applied selectively by 
  government attorneys for purposes other than those intended by Congress. They 
  have been excuses to violate civil rights. In many ways, the drug wars has 
  become a war on people. The new drug laws have very little to do with drug 
  related offenses. They have become instruments of oppression against ordinary 
  citizens. Our society is decaying, and part of the decay is not the drug 
  problem that we have. It is the misapplication of the drug related statutes 
  and the unchecked misconduct of governent attorneys. Unable to deal 
  effectively with professional criminals, federal prosecutors often use the 
  drug-related laws against politically-targeted individuals, tax protestors, 
  First amendment advocates or any one perceived to be a "threat" to the 
  established order. Some of the actions of law enforcement agents or governemnt 
  attorneys are premptive.Prosecutions and seizures have become a major legal 
  industry. Enlightened political, judicial, social leadership is essential. It 
  is very unfortunate for our country, which once was the shining beacon to the 
  world, the nations of the world, as a place of freedom. We need to redefine 
  ourselves a little better around the term "justice" and "fairness". Given the 
  present trend, our society and our basic freedoms are in great jeopardy.
  Top of the Page
The Misapplication of the Money Laundering Laws
Money Laundering is a ubiquitous term used to cover many kinds of possibly 
illegal transactions. It is this ambiguity that is confusing to many legitimate 
business persons. It becomes very easy for government agents to target high 
profile affluent people (usually people with assets to forfeit ), catch them at 
a vulnerable point and then maneuver them over a period of time so that they end 
up breaking a law that they might not have known even existed. The vague 
language of the money laundering laws has made it easy for government attorneys 
to escalate any offense involving any type of monetary transaction, into a money 
laundering offense with extremely high sentencing level and obtain 
"convictions", usually through "plea bargaining". Essentially, in money 
laundering cases, "plea-bargaining" become a threatening negotiation because 
government attorneys have a "big stick" with which to beat a defendant to 
submission: the money laundering laws. Because of the high sentencing levels and 
the easiness to convict under these laws, government attorneys have an easy time 
"persuading" defendants, particularly those involved in minor offenses, to plead 
guilty rather than risk a guaranteed long prison sentence. For defendants who 
cooperate or even agree to become government informers, the sentencing is 
relative lenient in spite of the so-called "mandatory sentencing guidelines". 
The "mandatory sentencing guidelines" and enhancements for "obstruction of 
justice"are reserved for those stubborn enough to plead "not guilty" and to ask 
for a trial. To "persuade" the stubborn to plead guilty, often government 
attorneys will issue collateral indictments and/or superseding indictments 
charging defendants with additional "crimes" for which there may be no valid 
basis. Frequently, the" plea bargaining" process is repeated again and again 
until a defendant is coerced to forego trial by pleading "guilty" to one or more 
counts of an indictment. With such tactics and through the misapplication of the 
money laundering laws, government attorneys can get easy "convictions". 
In recent years the money laundering laws have been used as instruments of 
oppression in our country against many targeted individuals. Charging and 
"plea-bargain" practices of federal prosecutors for alleged "money laundering 
offenses" have been excessive and abusive. 
Top of the Page
"Antidrug Legislation" -The Money Laundering Laws
Before discussing the Money Laundering Laws the following background information 
on previous banking laws is provided.
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970
Government efforts to regulate currency transactions go back many years. 
Combatting drug trafficking and money laundering did not require the money 
laundering laws which were passed in 1986. There were laws already in the books. 
In 1970, the House Committee on Banking was instrumental in the enactment into 
law of the Bank Records and Foreign Transaction Act (Public Law 91-508). That 
law contained the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, which together 
with certain record keeping provisions is commonly referred to as the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA). The primary purpose of the reporting requirements of the BSA 
was to identify the sources, volumes and movements of U.S. currency which was 
transported into or out of the country or being deposited in financial 
institutions. Presumably, this information was used as a primary tool in 
assisting law enforcement officials in the detection, investigation, and 
prosecution of certain crimes. Allegedly this was an effort to combat "crime". 
In reality it was nothing more than a government effort to regulate the 
financial transactions of all Americans. 
The Bank Secrecy Act 1970 required that certain records be made and retained by 
financial institutions. Specifically, the Act authorized the Secretary of the 
Treasury to require financial institutions to keep records of the identities of 
persons having a bank account in the United States and others acting on their 
behalf.The Act required all financial institutions to verify and record the 
identity, identification and address of all persons wishing to transfer $10,000 
or more, or those who were in receipt of $5000 or more in cash. This 
questionable procedure is known as currency transaction reporting (CTR) and is 
continuing to this day. However, the limits have been lowered. Banks are 
expected to report any cash transactions of $3,000 or more. Millions of such CRT 
reports are filed by the banks every year to the IRS's central computer.
The Comprehensive Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
The Department of Treasury and its Internal Revenue Service had lobbied 
extensively for the BSA's passage. The IRS had been given primary jurisdiction. 
They weren't satisfied. Although the BSA was an effective tool in detecting 
"criminals" who used financial institutions to further their "illegal activity", 
Treasury's pressure on the Congressional Banking committees continued. 
Presumably amendments to the BSA and other legislative initiatives were needed 
to combat the "astronomical rise in drug trafficking and money laundering 
schemes". This claim was true to some extent. Indeed money laundering activities 
from drug trafficking had increased. There was a need for a statute that would 
prevent the money laundering activities of organized crime from drug 
For the next sixteen years the Treasury Department kept on pressuring the House 
and Senate Banking Committees to introduce and pass legislation to "upgrade" 
BSA's enforcement requirements. From time to time, these Committees conducted 
hearings on how enforcement by the IRS could be toughened. 
In 1986, the House Committee responded to this pressure of government lobbyists 
by holding four days of hearings. On July 22 of that year, by a vote of 47-0, 
the House Banking Committee endorsed amendment H.R. 5176, the Comprehensive 
Money Laundering Prevention Act. H.R. 5176 was incorporated into H.R. 5484, the 
Omnibus Drug Bill, which was passed by the House in September of 1986, as 
"Drug-Related" legislation. Drug-related legislation was as sacred as apple pie 
and motherhood. The overwhelming Congressional support was no surprise. No 
Congressman would have dared to vote against such a well-packaged, piece of 
"drug" legislation. No one realized the potential for abuse of these laws. 
Thus the Comprehensive Money Laundering Contol Act of 1986 resulted in the 
enactment of Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 1956 and 1957. This legislation made 
money laundering a major crime with an unusually high level of sentencing. 
Specifically, the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 identified two kinds of 
offences; financial transaction money laundering and financial institution money 
The Money Laundering Control Amendments of 1988
Legislative History: On June 8, 1988, the House Committee on Banking, Finance, 
and Urban Affairs (Banking Committee), under the chairmanship of Rep. Fernand J. 
St. Germain, held a hearing on proposed amendments to the money laundering laws. 
In his opening statement before the Committee, Chairman St. Germain set the 
stage for the hearing as follows:
"It is news to no one that drugs generate massive sums of cash. This cash must 
be laundered-slipped into the main stream of commerce if the drug traffickers 
are to be successful. We intend to make these laundering operations as difficult 
and costly as possible. We cannot allow financial institutions, insured by the 
U.S. Government, to be used- whether by accident or design.
The subject of money laundering and the use of financial institutions to launder 
funds derived from illegal sources such as drug trafficking is not new to the 
Committee. In fact, over eighteen years ago, the Committee on Banking 
concentrated its efforts on ways to combat drug trafficking, organized and white 
collar crime, tax evasion and other crimes in which criminals use the nation's 
financial institutions as a means to conceal or launder funds." 
Following this introduction, Gerald L. Hilsher, Deputy Assistant Secertary (Law 
Enforcement) Department of the Treasury, and Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, 
testified. These government witnesses from Treasury and Justice emphasized the 
need to enact legislation "to prevent the laundering of money through financial 
institutions for illegal purposes". 
Based upon this testimony and without much floor discussion, the Banking 
Committee then justified the need for the proposed legislation. The need for 
amendments was additionally justified on the basis that most of the provisions 
of H.R. 5176, the Comprehensive Money Laundering Prevention Act, had been 
contained in Subtitle H of Title I of the "Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986" (Public 
Law 99-57Q). However, it was argued that certain provisions of H.R. 5176 were 
not included by the Senate in their version of the 1986 anti-drug proposals, and 
consequently did not become part of the 1986 Act. Thus the House Banking 
Committee was determined to include provisions of H.R. 5176 not enacted into law 
become part of the proposed 1988 amendments.
Thus, the Houae Banking Committee took it upon itself to rectify the 1986 
ommissions of the Senate, particularly those it believed would improve "law 
enforcement efforts to get at the drug traffickers and money launderers without 
unduly burdening the record keeping or reporting requirements of financial 
The Committee did not stop there. It also proposed amendments that curtailed the 
financial privacy of Americans such as the 1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act 
(RFPA). The RFPA (see Public Law 95-630, the Financial Institutions Regulatory 
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRICA)), protects the customers of 
financial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into their records while at 
the same time permits law enforcement offficials to pursue "legitimate" law 
enforcement investigations. The Committee wanted now the passage of an exemption 
from the notification requirements under the RFPA to alleged insiders of 
financial institutions. This had been ommitted also in the Senate version in 
1986 when it had been proposed as part of the amendments to the Bank Secrecy 
Act, mentioned earlier. The House Banking Committee wanted an "insider 
exemption" provision to RFPA. 
On June 9, 1988, the House Banking Committee adopted six amendments and ordered 
bill H.R. 4853, the Money Laundering Control Amendments of 1988, to be favorably 
reported for ratification by the House membership. 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The amendments were well packaged in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which 
introduced the Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, which, in 
turn, broadened the scope of predicate acts to include tax evasion and false or 
fraudulent statements made in connection with income tax filings. 
There were international aspects to this "Anti-drug abuse" legislation which 
included a requirement upon the Secretary of State for the Treasury to negotiate 
with other countries to ensure that they have adequate records on international 
currency transactions, which would be equivalent to the mandatory reporting 
requirements of U.S. financial institutions.
In essence, the net effect of the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 was by far more 
reaching than "antidrug legislation". It required the financial institutions to 
report any financial transaction as a suspected criminal violation committed 
against a bank or involving a financial transaction carried out through the 
facilities offered by the bank or its employees. The implementation of this 
legislation placed the unusual and costly burden upon banks and financial 
institutions and required them to participate in police functions of the 
government while threatening them with draconian penalties for non-compliance. 
Furthemore, the guidelines issued by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency 
(OCC) defined "suspected violation" as "a transaction or series of transactions 
for which there is reasonable cause to believe that a criminal violation has 
The OCC guidelines added to this burden of policing of the financial 
institutions by stating the following:
" The OCC cannot quantify the precise amount of evidence needed to trigger the 
reporting requirement any more than it can delineate all the relevant factors 
that a bank must consider in deciding whether or not to report a suspicion or 
otherwise irregular transactions. In many instances the suspicious nature of the 
transaction is a function not only of the transaction itself but also of the 
bank's experience with the individuals associated with the transactions, either 
as employees or as customers of the bank. In many situations, the bank will be 
able to discern the 'intent' of those involved in a suspicious transaction. 
Invariably however, the pivotal question of criminal intent will be left for the 
determination of law enforcement authorities. All that a bank can do in those 
situations is to make a practical assessment of the the suspicious transaction 
based upon a good faith examination of all the relevant factors. Clearly, the 
more serious the irregularity, particularly if it involves a bank insider, the 
greater the obligation upon the bank to fully investigate the matter". 
The strict guidelines of OCC gave no alternative to the financial institutions. 
Rather than making value judgents of what constituted "criminal activity" and 
risking penalties for missing some "criminal activity" for which they could be 
severely fined, the financial institutions opted to report every transaction as 
a "possible criminal violation". This was definetely an overkill in policing the 
financial affairs of all Americans. It had little to do with "antidrug 
legislation". The draconian penalties coerced the financial institutions to 
become watchdogs and spy and report on all larger financiancial transactions of 
their clients. 
Top of the page
The "Sting" Money Laundering Statute (18 U.S. Code, Section 1956 (a)(3)
Included in the the Money Laundering Act Amendments of 1988 was a "sting" 
statute, 18 U.S. Code, Section 1956 (a)(3). What members of the Banking 
Committee did not realize was that subsection (a)(3), the "sting" provision, was 
drafted by some Department of Justice officials to serve for purposes other than 
those intended. The language of the statute was left intentionally vague and 
generic. The definitions and due process requirements that hold for other 
sections of the same law, do not hold for the "sting" statute. The "sting" 
statute reads as follows:
Laundering of Monetary Instruments Section 1956 (a)(3)
Whoever, with the intent-
(A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control 
of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, 
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property 
represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used 
to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined $500,000 
under this title or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both. For purposes 
of this paragraph and paragraph (2), the term "represented" means any 
representation made by a law enforcement officer or by another person at the 
direction of, or with the approval of, a Federal official authorized to 
investigate or prosecute violations of this section.
The key words of this statute are "represented" and "any representation". The 
use of these words is what made this statute a "sting", and it is the essence of 
its subsequent abuse. How the representation is made, and whether it follows due 
process of the law. Whether there is any adherence to the way and to the purpose 
that Congress intended the law to be used. Whether a clear representation is 
made that the proceeds are indeed from a "specified unlawful activity", and what 
is the activity."Any representation", for a sting type of an offense, simply 
does not meet the due process requirement of our Constitution, particularly for 
an offense charging the major crime of "money laundering".
The sting provision in the Money Laundering Control Amendments of 1988, U.S.C 
Title 18 Section 1956(a)(3) is one of the most amorphous, ill defined, and 
controversial laws ever passed in this country. It is a statute which is being 
grossly abused by self-serving prosecutors for a variety of cases unrelated to 
Congressional intent.This is the only statute with vague wording and definitions 
which apply to sections of U.S.C Title 18 Section 1956(a)(1) and (a)(2) but not 
to (a)(3). It allows law enforcement agents and prosecutors to engage in a 
variety of undercover "sting" operations for non-drug related, 
government-induced, "money laundering thought crimes", without consideration of 
due process or of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth amendments. In most cases the 
government-induced underlying offenses may be minor. However, with the 
prosecutor's use of the money laundering statute, even if the government-induced 
or circumstantially-represented underlying offense is a petty misdeameanor, the 
targeted individual gets hit with a minimum sentencing offense level 20 or 22, 
if he even makes a simple deposit in a financial institution of proceeds from 
such "ostensibly" represented, by the undercover agent, transaction. Punishment 
may be as much as 51 months or more, same as for manslaughter, or major drug 
trafficking. Obviously the statute is unconstitutional and in gross violation, 
not only of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth and amendments, but of the Eighth 
amendment as well which provides constitutional safeguards for cruel and 
excessive punishments.
Top of the page
Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 1956 -1957. An Overview of the Money Laundering 
  In summary, the 1986 Act and subsequent amendments (including the 1988 
  amendments) made it a crime for someone, knowing that the property involved in 
  a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful 
  activity, to conduct or attempt to conduct such a financial transaction which 
  in fact involves the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity with the intent 
  to: (1) promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; (2) conceal or 
  disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of 
  the specified unlawful activity; or (3) avoid a transaction reporting 
  requirement under state or federal law. The "sting" provision of 1956 section 
  (a)(3) provided for the prosecution and punishment of hypothetical crimes 
  fabricated by government attorneys.
  More specifically, Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1956 is stated presently as 
  follows in the U.S. Code: 
  Laundering of monetary instruments :
  (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 
  represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or 
  attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the 
  proceeds of specified unlawful activity -
  (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
  activity; or
  (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 
  or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
  (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or inpart -
  (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
  ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
  (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, 
  shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of 
  the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or 
  imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
  (2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, 
  transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the 
  United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in 
  the United States from or through a place outside the United States -
  (A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 
  (B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the 
  transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form 
  of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission, or 
  transfer is designed in whole or in part -
  (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
  ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
  (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, 
  shall be sentenced to a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the monetary 
  instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or 
  transfer....whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty 
  years, or both.
  Laundering of Monetary Instruments under Section 1956 (a)(3)
  Whoever, with the intent-
  (A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 
  (B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control 
  of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
  (C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, 
  conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property 
  represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property 
  used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined 
  $500,000 under this title or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both. 
  For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (2), the term "represented" means 
  any representation made by a law enforcement officer or by another person at 
  the direction of, or with the approval of, a Federal official authorized to 
  investigate or prosecute violations of this section.
  For the purpose of the offense described in subparagraph (B), the defendant's 
  knowledge may be established by proof that a law enforcement officer 
  represented the matter specified in subparagraph (B) as true, and the 
  defendant's subsequent statements or actions indicate that the defendant 
  believed such representations to be true.
  Under the 1956 section the current U.S. Code gives the following definitions 
  for the above offenses: 
  (b) Whoever conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction described in 
  subsection (a)(1), or a transportation, transmission,or transfer described in 
  subsection (a)(2), is liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not 
  more than the greater of -
  (1) the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments involved in the 
  transaction; or
  (2) the term ''conducts'' includes initiating, concluding, or participating in 
  initiating, or concluding a transaction;
  (3) the term ''transaction'' includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, 
  transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial 
  institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, 
  exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any 
  stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a 
  safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or 
  to a financial institution, by whatever means effected;
  (4) the term ''financial transaction'' means 
  (A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign 
  (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or
  (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or 
  (iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle,vessel, or 
  aircraft, or
  (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is 
  engaged in, or the activities which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in 
  any way or degree;
  (5) the term ''monetary instruments'' means 
  (i) coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' 
  checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or 
  (ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or 
  otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery;
  (6) the term ''financial institution'' has the definition given that term in 
  section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, or the regulations 
  promulgated thereunder;
  Section (7) ,"specified unlawful activity" encompasses a myriad of violations 
  covered by many other laws interconnected through an unbelievable statutory 
  tracking that can bring under the umbrella of money laundering any imaginable 
  offense. Thus, any violation covered by any such other law which may include 
  some type of a financial transaction, can be structured by a prosecutor to 
  include a money laundering offense which in turn can escalate an offender's 
  sentence, even if the underlying offense is minor. 
  For example, under this section, ''specified unlawful activity'' means -
  (A) any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of 
  this title except an act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 
  of title 31;
  (B) with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in 
  the United States, an offense against a foreign nation involving -
  (i) the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled 
  substance (as such term is defined for the purposes of the Controlled 
  Substances Act) 
  (ii) kidnaping, robbery, or extortion; or
  (iii) fraud, or any scheme or attempt to defraud, by or against a foreign bank 
  (as defined in paragraph 7 of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 
  1978; (C) any act or acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise, as 
  that term is defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
  U.S.C. 848); (D) an offense under section 152 (relating to concealment of 
  assets; false oaths and claims; bribery), section 215 (relating to commissions 
  or gifts for procuring loans), any of sections 500 through 503 (relating to 
  certain counterfeiting offenses), section 513 (relating to securities of 
  States and private entities), section 542 (relating to entry of goods by means 
  of false statements), section 545 (relating to smuggling goods into the United 
  States), section 549 (relating to removing goods from Customs custody), 
  section 641 (relating to public money, property, or records), section 656 
  (relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or 
  employee), section 657 (relating to lending, credit, and insurance 
  institutions), section 658 (relating to property mortgaged or pledged to farm 
  credit agencies), section 666 (relating to theft or bribery concerning 
  programs receiving Federal funds), section 793, 794, or 798 (relating to 
  espionage), section 875 (relating to interstate communications), section 1005 
  (relating to fraudulent bank entries), 1006 (relating to fraudulent Federal 
  credit institution entries), 1007 (relating to Federal Deposit Insurance 
  transactions), 1014 (relating to fraudulentloan or credit applications), 1032 
  (relating to concealment ofassets from conservator, receiver, or liquidating 
  agent of financial institution), section 1201 (relating to kidnaping), section 
  1203 (relating to hostage taking), section 1708 (theft from the mail), section 
  2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft), or section 2319 
  (relating to copyright infringement) of this title, a felony violation o the 
  Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (relating to precursor and 
  essential chemicals), section 590 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1590) 
  (relating to aviation smuggling), section 422 of the Controlled Substances Act 
  (relating to transportation of drug paraphernalia), section 38(c) (relating to 
  criminal violations) of the Arms Export Control Act, section11 (relating to 
  violations) of the Export Administration Act of1979, section 206 (relating to 
  penalties) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, section 16 
  (relating to offenses and punishment) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, any 
  felony violation of section 9(c) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (relating to 
  food stamp fraud) involving a quantity of coupons having a value of not less 
  than $5,000, or any felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
  Act;................and so on
  Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1957
  Conduct prohibited by Section 1957 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 
  applies to those circumstances where the offence takes place in the US or in 
  the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US or where the 
  offence takes place outside the US but the defendant is a US citizen. It 
  applies to reporting requirements.
  Top of the page 
The Pontential for Abuse of the Money Laundering Laws
  In essence, the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 created a 
  new class of money laundering "crimes" which encompassed just about every 
  imaginable offense that a prosecutor could charge. Given the vague language of 
  the statute and without specific guidelines to federal prosecutors, created 
  the potential for abuse. With increasing frequency these laws have been used 
  selectively by federal attorneys to "criminalize" and prosecute"politically 
  incorrect" Americans for a variety of "offenses". These laws have been used 
  systematically, not only against drug traffickers, but also to punish those 
  Americans who for some reason were targeted as being outside the established 
  economic, political and social order. Ironically, U.S. Government Agencies and 
  major establishment-connected banks who have been the greatest violators of 
  money laundering activities globally, were never prosecuted for their money 
  laundering activities. The only exceptions were BCCI and American Express. 
  Their prosecution under the money laundering laws amounted to nothing more 
  than a slap on the hand. The U.S. banks that were closely affiliated with BCCI 
  did not even receive a reprimand. In the case of American Express, the entire 
  blame was placed on a low level, "ethnic" manager of a small Florida branch. 
  No one else in American Express was prosecuted. The government "settled" the 
  case for approximately $50 million. Similarly many other similar criminal 
  cases of money laundering have been "settled" like civil cases through the 
  imposition of "fines" and without criminal sanctions. The criminal sanctions 
  are usually reserved for the small time offenders and the "politically 
  Top of the page 
The Unconstitutionality of the Money Laundering "Sting" Statute, Title 18, U.S. 
Code, Section 1956 (a)(3).
  The Money Laundering "Sting" Statute, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1956 (a)(3) 
  violates the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments of our Constitution by 
  permitting the improper prearrangement and orchestration of a "crime" and the 
  fabrication of the evidence with guaranteed conviction and level of 
  sentencing. Convictions are easily obtained through a prearranged, low 
  threshold of proof. Abuses of the "sting" statute have been attested and 
  documented by numerous sources, testimonies, newspaper and magazine articles, 
  government records of public hearings, improper prosecutions documented by 
  caselaw, and even by the U.S. Sentencing Commission's internal and independent 
  findings; the latter suggesting that due process was not followed in the 
  application of the "sting" statute and that as many as 68% of the persons that 
  have been convicted may be due to misrepresentations by law enforcement 
  officials using this "sting" statute. These 68% of convicted individuals never 
  believed that they were involved in a financial transaction which included 
  "proceeds of an unlaful activity", because no such representation was made by 
  law enforcement officers. Most of those convicted were coerced into plea 
  bargaining because of the high sentencing level of money laundering offenses. 
  In brief, the record proves unprecedented abuses. Continuing misapplication of 
  this law by federal prosecutors is subverting and undermining our Criminal 
  Justice System. Also, its continuous abuse raises greater issues and 
  philosophies that basic constitutional freedoms and guarantees are threatened 
  in our country. 
  Why is the "sting" Money Laundering Statute Unconstitutional? 
  Fourth Amendment Violations: The statute violates clearly the Fourth 
  Amendment's guarantee of the right of the people to be secure in their persons 
  against unreasonable searches. The "sting" itself, particularly when 
  outrageously applied and orchestrated, often without sufficient probable 
  cause, is a form of unreasonable search and invasion of privacy.
  Fifth Amendment Violations: The "sting" statute violates the Fifth Amendment 
  and due process against self-incrimination in that no warning is given to the 
  targeted person and no Miranda rights are read that any statements made (even 
  the absence of statements or questions, interpreted as "willful neglect") will 
  be used against a defendant for money laundering or any other type of 
  prosecution. More often than not, the "sting" turns into a witch hunt and an 
  unethical fishing expedition, after the undercover agent wins the trust or 
  friendship of the targeted person. Furthermore, it violates the Fifth 
  Amendment when the government prosecutor's conduct and overzealousness for 
  conviction, by any means, become outrageous. Due process requirements of the 
  Fifth amendment are often violated because representation is not properly made 
  by law enforcement officers that the proceeds of a financial transaction are 
  indeed from an "unlawful activity". The key words in the statute are that the 
  proceeds are "from some form, though necessarily which form" of unlawful 
  activity". Thus the word "representation" is downgraded to "any 
  representation" in the statute and it is further downgraded in the definitions 
  to "some form, though necessarily which form" of unlawful activity. This vague 
  wording is the source of prosecutorial abuse. It allows a very vague 
  representation and misunderstanding which violates the due process requirement 
  of the Fifth Amendment.
  Sixth Amendment Violations: The statute violates the Sixth Amendment because 
  its language is ambiguous and vague and in most "sting" money laundering cases 
  a targeted person is not informed clearly in the money laundering indictment 
  of the nature and cause of the underlying offense. Frequently, neither 
  defendants nor juries understand the statutory tracking of the money 
  laundering charge or the fact that underlying offenses are used only for 
  "definitional" purposes. Also, in many "sting" money laundering cases a 
  defendant does not get a speedy trial as the sixth Amendment requires. In most 
  "sting" cases prosecutors deprive defendants of speedy trial with the excuse 
  that there is an ongoing investigation of the defendant for "other crimes" 
  revealed during the "sting". Often, the prosecutor will reindict a defendant, 
  adding more counts on a piecemeal basis, to avoid the speedy trial and to 
  simply coerce a defendant to "plea bargain".
  Eighth Amendment Violations: The "sting" statute clearly violates the Eighth 
  Amendment, because it imposes excessive bail, excessive fines, and imposes 
  cruel and unusual punishment totally out of proportion to the underlying 
  offense. It provides for $500,000 in fines and up to 20 years imprisonment, 
  same as a major drug trafficking violation, even if the alleged, 
  misrepresented, underlying offense of the "sting" is only a petty misdemeanor. 
  Often the alleged unlawful activity does not fall within the predicate 
  offenses of section (7) of the law to qualify as a money laundering offense. A 
  circuitrous statutory tracking is often used to bring the alleged offense 
  within the ambit of money laundering offenses with considerable, unusual and 
  cruel escalation of the offense level. 
  Top of the page 
  An Example of Money Laundering Law Misapplication. 
  The case of Dr.George Pararas-Carayannis presented in another section of this 
  page is an example of the frequent misapplications of the money laundering 
  laws. For unknown reasons, and in the absence of any ongoing criminal 
  activity, Dr. Pararas-Carayannis, an internationally recognized scientist, was 
  targeted for a money laundering "sting". The undercover government agent in 
  the "sting" was a young woman who was instructed by the prosecutor to befriend 
  Dr. Pararas-Carayannis and to ask him to process through his merchant account 
  a few credit card slips of her newly started "escort service" because she did 
  not, as yet, opened an account of her own. She claimed that she had the 
  necessary licences and that she was going to advertize in the Yellow Pages. No 
  other representation was ever made. 
  Dr. Pararas-Carayannis processed the slips through his account and gave the 
  young woman her money, deducting only for taxes and credit card company fees. 
  Subsequently he was charged by a federal prosecutor with "money laundering". 
  Although this had been a "sting" and there had been no real underlying 
  unlawful activity, the indictment charged him with the thought crime of 
  believing that in his own mind he was "disguising and concealing" proceeds of 
  "some form of unlawful activity" (even though there had been no such 
  representation). According to the indictment he was not charged with 
  committing or being a participant in any underlying unlawful activity (since 
  there was none). The prosecutor further claimed in court that the hypothetical 
  underlying offense needed not be represented nor proven for conviction. The 
  disclosure that the proceeds were from an escort service was enough, since 
  "everyone knows that escort services are fronts for prostitution".
  Subsequent "plea-bargaining" efforts by the federal prosecutor to coerce Dr. 
  Pararas-Carayannis into a guilty plea before trial were clearly human rights' 
  violations. Because he refused to "plea bargain", the government attorney, 
  intentionally inflicted upon him unprecedented psychological torture through 
  unwarranted, continuous, retaliatory prosecutions, charging frivolous, 
  unsupported allegations - charges which could not be supported by facts or 
  evidence and which were subsequently dismissed. The single purpose of this 
  psychological/legal bulldozing was to break Dr. Pararas-Carayannis emotionally 
  and to coerce him to accept a guilty plea for the fabricated money laundering 
  charges of the"sting" scheme involving the proceeds (a few hundred dollars) of 
  the alleged unlawful activity - the non-existent, "escort" service. Allegedly 
  he netted $35 from this activity.
  As a result of this unprecedented psychological torture and inhumane stress he 
  had been subjected, six weeks after the trial, Dr. Pararas-Carayannis suffered 
  a nearly fatal heart attack which resulted in his total disability and a 
  progressing heart failure. Yet, in spite of his dire health condition and 
  advanced age, he was subsequently sentenced to a total of 77 months for the 
  fabricated offense (41 months in prison and 36 months under court supervision. 
  This is in addition to seven years of supervised release he has already served 
  , making his total punishment for the fabricated "money laundering" offense 
  more than THIRTEEN (13) years. Clearly, this has been an outrageous 
  misapplication of the money laundering laws.
  Top of the page 
Forfeiture Laws
  An AACLJ member from Colorado provided us the following letter from the 
  Colorado Herald. This letter summarizes the effect of prevailing unreasonable 
  attitudes on allegedly fighting "crime" with forfeiture laws aimed primarily 
  at raising revenues for law enforcement agencies.
Support Reform of Forfeiture Laws
  Did you know that your money, savings and property can be seized by zealous 
  officials based on an informant's comment or weak circumstantial evidence - 
  all without trial or due process? Did you know that if you are caught carrying 
  significant cash and this money elicits a reaction from a drug-sniffing dog 
  that all the money can be confiscated?
  This is especially alarming as more than 96 per cent of U.S. currency tests 
  positive for cocaine. This has already occurred in a number of cases.
  Then, when charges have been dropped or you have been found not guilty, you 
  have to sue the government to get your property back. Good luck paying for 
  this when all your assets are gone. And, where are you and your family going 
  to live while this often two year process takes place?
  The drug war craze has blended with politicians' tough-on-crime posturing to 
  create a nightmare.
  In 1990 a Department of Justice bulletin sent to all U.S. attorneys:
  "Significantly increasing forfeiture production to reach our budgeted targets. 
  Failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the Department's 
  forfeiture program to criticism. Every effort must be made to increase 
  forfeiture income ...."
  Assistant Attorney General Edward Dennis advising U.S. attorneys: "To divert 
  personnel from other activities, including criminal cases, to prepare all 
  forfeiture cases for action ...." 
  In 1992, the California Committee on Public Safety: "Asset forfeiture is a 
  multi-million dollar source of revenue for law enforcement. Thus, there is an 
  incentive to seize property as a revenue source." 
  In addition, in 1993, a Los Angeles County.deputy sheriff testified officers 
  stole $60 million in forfeited cash and property in 1988-89. A similar pattern 
  of activitv has been reported in New York and many other areas. And this was 
  six years ago.
  If this is alarming to you, support the forfeiture Reform Bill (HR 1916) by 
  writing your representative. The bill is not ideal, but does begin to correct 
  the insanity.
  Steve Self
  Durango, Colorado 
Top of the Page
AACLJ Home Page


Back to Top


War Powers ?


 Researched and written by: Gene Schroder, Alvin Jenkins, Jerry Russell, Ed Petrowsky, Russell Grieder, Darrell Schroder, Walter Marston, Lynn Bitner, Billy Schroder, Van Stafford, Fred Peters, Tinker Spain, and Paul Bailey. This web site is sponsored by American Freedom Coalition. Due to file size limitations we have elected not to include scanned images of the exhibits that appear in the book however, you may obtain a full printed report that includes certified copies of all official documents as specified. For information on how to order books, tapes, and how to become a supporting member of the American Freedom Coalition click here Letters to our servants. They must be educated! Example Letter to the President Example Letter to the House of Representatives Example Letter to the United States Senate The Report... NATIONAL EMERGENCY: (as defined in Black's Law Dictionary) A state of national crisis; a situation demanding immediate and extraordinary national or federal action. Congress has made little or no distinction between a "state of national emergency" and a "state of war". Brown v. Bernstein, D.C.Pa., 49 F.Supp. 728, 732. This report begins with a series of documents which are representative (Exhibits 1 through 7), of the documents contained in this Report. We will be quoting from in many cases, reports, Senate and Congressional reports, hearings before National Emergency Committees, Presidential Papers, Statutes at Large, and the United States Code. Exhibit 8 is taken from a book written by Swisher called Constitutional Development. Let's read the first paragraph. It says: "We may well wonder in view of the precedents now established," said Charles E. Hughes, (Supreme Court Justice) in 1920, "whether constitutional government as heretofore maintained in this Republic could survive another great war even victoriously waged." How could that happen? Surely, if we go out and fight a war and win it, we'd have to end up stronger than the day we started, wouldn't we? Justice Hughes goes on to say: "The conflict known as the World War had ended as far as military hostilities were concerned, but was not yet officially terminated. Most of the war statutes were still in effect, many of the emergency organizations were still in operation." What is this man talking about when he speaks of "war statutes in effect and emergency organizations still in operation"? In 1933 (Exhibit 9), Congressman Beck, speaking from the Congressional Record, states: "I think of all the damnable heresies that have ever been suggested in connection with the Constitution, the doctrine of emergency is the worst. it means that when Congress declares an emergency, there is no Constitution. This means its death. It is the very doctrine that the German chancellor is invoking today in the dying hours of the parliamentary body of the German republic, namely, that because of an emergency, it should grant to the German chancellor absolute power to pass any law, even though the law contradicts the Constitution of the German republic. Chancellor Hitler is at least frank about it. We pay the Constitution lipservice, but the result is the same." Congressman Beck is saying that, of all the damnable heresies that ever existed, this doctrine of emergency has got to be the worst, because once Congress declares an emergency, there is no Constitution. He goes on to say: "But the Constitution of the United States, as a restraining influence in keeping the federal government within the carefully prescribed channels of power, is moribund, if not dead. We are witnessing its death-agonies, for when this bill becomes a law, if unhappily it becomes a law, there is no longer any workable Constitution to keep the Congress within the limits of its Constitutional powers." What bill is Congressman Beck talking about? In 1933, "the House passed the Farm Bill by a vote of more than three to one." Again, we see the doctrine of emergency. Once an emergency is declared, there is no Constitution. The cause and effect of the doctrine of emergency is the subject of this Report. In 1973, in Senate Report 93-549 (Exhibit 10), the first sentence reads: "Since March the 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of declared national emergency." Let's go back to Exhibit 9 just before this. What did that say? It says that if a national emergency is declared, there is no Constitution. Now, let us return to Exhibit 10. Since March the 9th of 1933, the United States has been, in fact, in a state of declared national emergency. Referring to the middle of this exhibit: "This vast range of powers, taken together, confer enough authority to rule the country without reference to normal constitutional processes. Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President may: seize property; organize and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign military forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; and, in a plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all American citizens" and this situation has continued uninterrupted since March the 9th of 1933. In the introduction to Senate Report 93-549 (Exhibit 11): "A majority of the people of the United States have lived all their lives under emergency rule." Remember, this report was produced in 1973. The introduction goes on to say: "For 40 years, freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees, been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency." The introduction continues: "And, in the United States, actions taken by the government in times of great crisis have from, at least, the Civil War, in important ways shaped the present phenomenon of a permanent state of national emergency." How many people were taught that in school? How could it possibly be that something which could suspend our Constitution would not be taught in school? Amazing, isn't it? Where does this (Exhibit 12) come from? Is it possible that, in our Constitution, there could be some section which could contemplate what these previous documents are referring to? In Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution of the United States of America, we find the following words: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety may require it." Habeas Corpus - the Great Writ of Liberty. This is the writ which guarantees that the government cannot charge us and hold us with any crime, unless they follow the procedure of due process of law. This writ also says, in effect, that the privilege of due process of law cannot be suspended, and that the government cannot not operate its arbitrary prerogative power against We the People. But we see that the great Writ of Liberty can, in fact, under the Constitution, be suspended when an invasion or a rebellion necessitates it. In the 5th Amendment to the Constitution (Exhibit 13), it says: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger..." We reserved the charging power for ourselves, didn't we? We didn't give that power to the government. And we also said that the government would be powerless to charge one of the citizens or one of the peoples of the United States with a crime unless We, the People, through our grand jury, orders it to do so through an indictment or a presentment. And if We, the People, don't order it, the government cannot do it. If it tried to do it, we would simply follow the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and they would have to release us, wouldn't they? They could not hold us. But let us recall that, in Exhibit 13, it says: "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in times of War or public danger." We can see here that the framers of the Constitution were already contemplating times when there would be conditions under which it might be necessary to suspend the guarantees of the Constitution. Also from Senate Report 93-549 (Exhibit 14), and remember that our congressmen wrote these reports and these documents and they're talking about these emergency powers and they say: "They are quite careful and restrictive on the power, but the power to suspend is specifically contemplated by the Constitution in the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Now, this is well known. This is not a concept that was not known to rulers for many, many years. The concepts of constitutional dictatorship went clear back to the Roman Republic. And there, it was determined that, in times of dire emergencies, yes, the constitution and the rights of the people could be suspended, temporarily, until the crisis, whatever its nature, could be resolved. But once it was done, the Constitution was to be returned to its peacetime position of authority. In France, the situation under which the constitution could be suspended is called the State of Siege. In Great Britain, it's called the Defense of the Realm Acts. In Germany, in which Hitler became a dictator, it was simply called Article 48. In the United States, it is called the War Powers. If that was, in fact, the case, and we are under a war emergency in this country, then there should be evidence of that war emergency in the current law that exists today. That means we should be able to go to the federal code known as the USC or United States Code, and find that statute, that law, in existence. And if we went to the library today and picked up a copy of 12 USC and went to Section 95 (b) (Exhibit 15), we will find a law which states: "The actions, regulations, rules, licenses, orders and proclamations heretofore or hereafter taken, promulgated, made, or issued by the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Treasury since March the 4th, 1933, pursuant to the authority conferred by Subsection (b) of Section 5 of the Act of October 6th, 1917, as amended [12 USCS Sec. 95a], are hereby approved and confirmed. (Mar. 9, 1933, c. 1, Title I, Sec. 1, 48 Stat. 1.)". Now, what does this mean? It means that everything the President or the Secretary of the Treasury has done since March the 4th of 1933, or anything that the President or the Secretary of the Treasury is hereafter going to do, is automatically approved and confirmed. Referring back to Exhibit 10, let us remember that, according to the Congressional Record of 1973, the United States has been in a state of national emergency since 1933. Then we realize that 12 USC, Section 95 (b) is current law. This is the law that exists over this United States this moment. If that be the case, let us see if we can understand what is being said here. As every action, rule or law put into effect by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury since March the 4th of 1933 has or will be confirmed and approved, let us determine the significance of that date in history. What happened on March the 4th of 1933? On March the 4th of 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was inaugurated as President of the United States. Referring to his inaugural address, which was given at a time when the country was in the throes of the Great Depression, we read (Exhibit 16): "I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption. But in the event that the Congress shall fall to take one of these two courses, and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe." On March the 4th, 1933, at his inaugural, President Roosevelt was saying that he was going to ask Congress for the extraordinary authority available to him under the War Powers Act. Let's see if he got it. On March the 5th, President Roosevelt asked for a special and extraordinary session of Congress in Proclamation 2038. He called for the special session of Congress to meet on March the 9th at noon. And at that Congress, he presented a bill, an Act, to provide for relief in the existing national emergency in banking and for other purposes. In the enabling portion of that Act (Exhibit 17), it states: "Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress hereby declares that a serious emergency exists and that it is imperatively necessary speedily to put into effect remedies of uniform national application." What is the concept of the rule of necessity, referred to in the enabling portion of the act as "imperatively necessary speedily"? The rule of necessity is a rule of law which states that necessity knows no law. A good example of the rule of necessity would be the concept of self-defense. The law says, "Thou shalt not kill". But also know that, if you are in dire danger, in danger of losing your life, then you have the absolute right of self-defense. You have the right to kill to protect your own life. That is the ultimate rule of necessity. Thus we see that the rule of necessity overrides all other law, and, in fact, allows one to do that which would normally be against the law. So it is reasonable to assume that the wording of the enabling portion of the Act of March 9, 1933, is an indication that what follows is something which will probably be against the law. It will probably be against the Constitution of the United States, or it would not require that the rule of necessity be invoked to enact it. In the Act of March 9, 1933 (Exhibit 17), it further states in Title 1, Section 1: "The actions, regulations, rules, licenses, orders and proclamations heretofore or hereafter taken, promulgated, made, or issued by the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Treasury since March the 4th, 1933, pursuant to the authority conferred by subdivision (b) of Section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, are hereby approved and confirmed." Where have we read those words before? This is the exact same wording as is found (Exhibit 15) today in Title 12, USC 95 (b). The language in Title 12, USC 95 (b) is exactly the same as that found in the Act of March 9, 1933, Chapter 1, Title 1, Section 48, Statute 1. The Act of March 9, 1933, is still in full force and effect today. We are still under the Rule of Necessity. We are still in a declared state of national emergency, a state of emergency which has existed, uninterrupted, since 1933, or for over sixty years. As you may remember, the authority to do this is conferred by Subsection (b) of Section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended. What was the authority which was used to declare and enact the emergency in this Act? If we look at the Act of October 6, 1917 (Exhibit 18), we see that at the top right-hand part of the page, it states that this was: "An Act To define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy, and for other purposes." By the year 1917, the United States was involved in World War 1; at that point, it was recognized that there were probably enemies of the United States, or allies of enemies of the United States, living within the continental borders of our nation in a time of war. Therefore, Congress passed this act which identified who could be declared enemies of the United States, and, in this act, we gave the government total authority over those enemies to do with as it saw fit. We also see, however, in Section 2, Subdivision (c) in the middle, and again at the bottom of the page: "other than citizens of the United States." The act specifically excluded citizens of the United States, because we realized in 1917 that the citizens of the United States were not enemies. Thus, we were excluded from the war powers over enemies in this act. Section 5 (b) of the same act (Exhibit 19), states: "That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States)". Again, we see here that citizens, and the transactions of citizens made wholly within the United States, were specifically excluded from the war powers of this act. "We the People", were not enemies of our country; therefore, the government did not have total authority over us as they were given over our enemies. It is important to draw attention again to the fact that citizens of the United States in October, 1917, were not called enemies. Consequently the government, under the war powers of this act, did not have authority over us; we were still protected by the Constitution. Granted, over enemies of this nation, the government was empowered to do anything it deemed necessary, but not over us. The distinction made between enemies of the United States and citizens of the United States will become crucial later on. In Section 2 of the Act of March 9, 1933 (Exhibit 17), "Subdivision (b) of Section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows;" So we see that they are now going to amend Section 5 (b). Now let's see how it reads after it's amended. The amended version of Section 5 (b) reads (emphasis added): "During time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that be may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as be may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, by any person within the United States or anyplace subject to the jurisdiction thereof". What just happened? At as far as commercial, monetary or business transactions were concerned, the people of the United States were no longer differentiated from any other enemy of the United States. We had lost that crucial distinction. Comparing Exhibit 17 with Exhibit 19, we can see that the phrase which excluded transactions executed wholly within the United States has been removed from the amended version of Section 5 (b) of the Act of March 9, 1933, Section 2, and replaced with "by any person within the United States or anyplace subject to the jurisdiction thereof'. All monetary transactions, whether domestic or international in scope, were now placed at the whim of the President of the United States through the authority given to him by the Trading with the Enemy Act. To summarize this critical point: On October the 6th of 1917, at the beginning of America's involvement in World War 1, Congress passed a Trading with the Enemy Act empowering the government to take control over any and all commercial, monetary or business transactions conducted by enemies or allies of enemies within our continental borders. That act also defined the term "enemy" and excluded from that definition citizens of the United States. In Section 5 (b) of this act, we see that the President was given unlimited authority to control the commercial transactions of defined enemies, but we see that credits relating solely to transactions executed wholly within the United States were excluded from that controlling authority. As transactions wholly domestic in nature were excluded from authority, the government had no extraordinary control over the daily business conducted by the citizens of the United States, because we were certainly not enemies. Citizens of the United States were not enemies of their country in 1917, and the transactions conducted by citizens within this country were not considered to be enemy transactions. But in looking again at Section 2 of the Act of March 9, 1933, (Exhibit 17), we can see that the phrase excluding wholly domestic transactions has been removed from the amended version and replaced with "by any person within the United States or anyplace subject to the jurisdiction thereof'. The people of the United States were now subject to the power of the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6,1917, as amended. For the purposes of all commercial, monetary, and, in effect, all business transactions. "We the People", became the same as the enemy, and were treated no differently. There was no longer any distinction. It is important here to note that, in the Acts of October 6, 1917 and March 9, 1933, it states: "during times of war or during any other national emergency declared by the President...". So we now see that the war powers not only included a period of war, but also a period of "national emergency" as defined by the President of the United States. When either of these two situations occur, the President may, (Exhibit 17) "through any agency that he may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regulate or prohibit under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by banking institutions as defined by the President and export, boarding, melting or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency by any person within the United States or anyplace subject to the jurisdiction thereof." What can the President do now to the We, the People, under this Section? He can do anything he wants to do. It's purely at his discretion, and he can use any agency or any license that he desires to control it. This is called a constitutional dictatorship. In Senate Document 93-549 (Exhibit 20), Congress declared that a serious emergency exists, at: "48 Stat. 1. The exclusion of domestic transactions, formerly found in the Act, was deleted from Sect. 5 (b) at this time." Our Congress wrote that in the year 1973. Now let's find out about the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917. Quoting from a Supreme Court decision (Exhibit 21), Stoehr v. Wallace, 1921: "The Trading With the Enemy Act, originally and as amended, is strictly a war measure, and finds its sanction in the provision empowering Congress "to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water" Const. Art. 1, Sect. 8, c1. 11. P.241". Remember your Constitution? "Congress shall have the power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal and make all rules concerning the captures on the land and the water of the enemies," all rules. If that be the case, let us look at the memorandum of law that now covers trading with the enemy, the "Memorandum of American Cases and Recent English Cases on The Law of Trading With the Enemy" (Exhibit 22), remembering that we are now the same as the enemy. In this memorandum, we read: "Every species of intercourse with the enemy is illegal. This prohibition is not limited to mere commercial intercourse." This is the case of The Rapid (1814). Additionally, "No contract is considered as valid between enemies, at least so far as to give them a remedy in the courts of either government, and they have, in the language of the civil law, no ability to sustain a persona standi in judicio". In other words, they have no personal lights at law in court. This is the case of The Julia (1813). In the next case, the case of The Sally (1814) (Exhibit 23), we read the words: "By the general law of prize, property engaged in an illegal intercourse with the enemy is deemed enemy property. It is of no consequence whether it belong to an ally or to a citizen; the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character, and attaches to it all the penal consequences of enemy ownership". Reading further in the memorandum, again from the case of The Rapid: "The law of prize is part of the law of nations. In it, a hostile character is attached to trade, independently of the character of the trader who pursues or directs it. Condemnation to the use of the captor is equally the fate of the property of the belligerent and of the property found engaged in anti-neutral trade. But a citizen or an ally may be engaged in a hostile trade, and thereby involve his property in the fate of those in whose cause he embarks". Again from the memorandum (Exhibit 24): "The produce of the soil of the hostile territory, as well as other property engaged in the commerce of the hostile power, as the source of its wealth and strength, are always regarded as legitimate prize, without regard to the domicile of the owner". From the case (Exhibit 25) of The William Bagaley (1866): "In general, during war, contracts with, or powers of attorney or agency from, the enemy executed after outbreak of war are illegal and void; contracts entered into with the enemy prior to the war are either suspended or are absolutely terminated; partnerships with an enemy are dissolved; powers of attorney from the enemy, with certain exceptions, lapse; payments to the enemy (except to agents in the United States appointed prior to the war and confirmed since the war) are illegal and void; all rights of an enemy to sue in the courts are suspended." From Senate Report No. 113 (Exhibit 26), in which we find An Act to Define, Regulate, and Punish Trading with the Enemy, and For Other Purposes, we read: "The trade or commerce regulated or prohibited is defined in Subsections (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), page 4. This trade covers almost every imaginable transaction, and is forbidden and made unlawful except when allowed under the form of licenses issued by the Secretary of Commerce (p. 4, sec. 3, line 18). This authorization of trading under licenses constitutes the principal modification of the rule of international law forbidding trade between the citizens of belligerents, for the power to grant such licenses, and therefore exemption from the operation of law, is given by the bill." It says no trade can be conducted or no intercourse can be conducted without a license, because, by mere definition of the enemy, and under the prize law, all intercourse is illegal. That was the first case we looked at, Exhibit 22, wasn't it? So once we were declared enemies, all intercourse became illegal for us. The only way we could now do business or any type of legal intercourse was to obtain permission from our government by means of a license. We are certainly required to have a Social Security Card, which is a license to work, and a Drivers License, which gives the government the ability to restrict travel; all business in which we engage ourselves requires us to have a license, does it not? Returning once again to the Memorandum of Law: (Exhibit 27) "But it is necessary always to bear in mind that a war cannot be carried on without hurting somebody, even, at times, our own citizens. The public good, however, must prevail over private gain. As we said in Bishop v. Jones (28 Texas, 294), there cannot be "a war for arms and a peace for commerce". One of the most important features of the bill is that which provides for the temporary taking over of the enemy property." This point of law is important to keep in mind, for it authorizes the temporary takeover of enemy property. The question is: Once the war terminates, the property must be returned, mustn't it? The property that is confiscated, and the belligerent night of the government during the period of war, must be returned when the war terminates. Let us take the case of a ship in harbor; war breaks out, and the Admiral says, "I'm seizing your ship." Can you stop him? No. But when the war is over, the Admiral must return your ship to you. This point is important to bear in mind, for we will return to, and expand upon, it later in the report. Reading from (Exhibit 28) Senate Document No. 43, "Contracts Payable in Gold" written in 1933: "The ultimate ownership of all property is in the State; individual so-called "ownership" is only by virtue of government, i. e., law, amounting to mere user; and use must be in accordance with law and subordinate to the necessities of the State." Who owns all the property? Who owns the property you call "yours"? Who has the authority to mortgage property? Let us continue with a Supreme Court decision, (Exhibit 29) United States v. Russell: "Private property, the Constitution provides, shall not be taken for public use without just compensation..." That is the peacetime clause, isn't it? Further (emphasis added), "Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized or appropriated to public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the owner..." This quote, and indeed this case, provides a vivid frustration of the potential power of the government. Now, let us return to the period of time after March 4, 1933, and take a close look at what really occurred. On March 4, 1933, in his inaugural address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt asked for the authority of the war powers, and called a special session of Congress for the purpose of having those powers conferred to him. On March the 2nd, 1933, however, we find that Herbert Hoover had written a letter to the Federal Reserve Board of New York, asking them for recommendations for action based on the over-all situation at the time. The Federal Reserve Board responded with a resolution (Exhibit 30) which they had adopted, an excerpt from which follows: "Resolution Adopted By The Federal Reserve Board Of New York. Whereas, in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the continued and increasing withdrawal of currency and gold from the banks of the country has now created a national emergency ..." In order to fully appreciate the significance of this last quote, we must recall that, in 1913, The Federal Reserve Act was passed, authorizing the creation of a central bank, the thought of which had already been noted in the Constitution. The basic idea of the central bank was, among other things, for it to act as a secure repository for the gold of the people. We, the People, would bring our gold to the huge, strong vaults of the Federal Reserve, and we would be issued a note which said, in effect, that, at any time we desired, we could bring that note back to the bank and be given back our gold which we had deposited. Until 1933, that agreement, that contract between the Federal Reserve and its depositors, was honored. Federal Reserve notes, prior to 1933, were indeed redeemable in gold. After 1933, the situation changed drastically. In 1933, during the depths of the Depression, at the time when We, the People, were struggling to stay alive and keep our families fed, the bankers began to say: "People are coming in now, wanting their gold, wanting us to honor this contract we have made with them to give them their gold on demand, and this contractual obligation is creating a national emergency." How could that happen? Reading from the Public Papers of Herbert Hoover (Exhibit 31): "Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved, that, in this emergency, the Federal Reserve Board is hereby requested to urge the President of the United States to declare a bank holiday, Saturday, March 4, and Monday, March 6. In other words, President Roosevelt was urged to close down the banking system and make it unavailable make it unavailable for a short period of time. What was to happen during that period of time? Reading again from the Federal Reserve Board resolution (Exhibit 31), we find a proposal for an executive order, to be worded as follows: "Whereas, it is provided in Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, that "the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange and the export, hoarding, melting, or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, *** " Now, in any normal usage of the American language, the standard accepted meaning of a series of three asterisks after a quotation means that what follows also must be quoted exactly, doesn't it? If it's not, that's a fraudulent use of the American language. At that point where that, *** " began, what did the original Act of October 6, 1917, say? Referring back to Exhibit 19, we find that the remainder of Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 says: "(other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States)." This portion of Section 5 (b) specifically prohibited the government from taking control of We, the People's money and transactions, didn't it? However, let us now read the remainder of Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended on March 9, 1933 (Exhibit 17): "by any person within the United States or any place subject to the Jurisdiction thereof." Comparing the original with the amended version of Section 5 (b), we can see the full significance of the amended version, wherein the exclusion of domestic transactions from the powers of the Act was deleted, and "any person" became subject to the extraordinary powers conferred by the act. Further, we can now see that the usage of *** " was, in all to likelihood, meant be deliberately misleading, if not fraudulent in nature. Further, in the next section of the Federal Reserve Board's proposal, we find that anyone violating any provision of this act will be fined not more than $10,000.00, or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both. A severe enough penalty at any time, but one made all the more harsh by the economic conditions in which most Americans found themselves at the time. And where were these alterations and amendments to be found? Not from the government itself, initially; no, they are first to be found in a proposal from the Federal Reserve Board of New York, a banking institution. Let us recall the chronology of events: Herbert Hoover, in his last days as President of the United States, asked for a recommendation from the Federal Reserve Board of New York, and they responded with their proposals. We see that President Hoover did not act on the recommendation, and believed the actions were "neither justified nor necessary" (Appendix, Public Papers of Herbert Hoover, p. 1088) . Let us see what happened; remember on March 4, 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was inaugurated as President of the United States. On March 5, 1933, President Roosevelt called for an extraordinary session of Congress to be held on March 9,1933, as can be seen in Exhibit 32: "Whereas, public interests require that the Congress of the United States should be convened in extra session at twelve o'clock, noon, on the Ninth day of March, 1933, to receive such communication as may be made by the Executive." On the next day, March 6, 1933, President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2039, which has been included in this report, starting at the bottom of Exhibit 32. In Exhibit 32, we find the following: "Whereas there have been heavy and unwarranted withdrawals of gold and currency from our banking institutions for the purpose of hoarding" Right at the beginning, we have a problem. And the problem rests in the question of who should be the judge of whether or not my gold, on deposit at the Federal Reserve, with which I have a contract which says, in effect, that I may withdraw my gold at my discretion, is being withdrawn by me in an "unwarranted" manner. Remember, the people of the United States were in dire economic straits at this point. If I had gold at the Federal Reserve, I would consider withdrawing as much of my gold as I needed for my family and myself a "warranted" action. But the decision was not left up to We, the People. It is also important to note that it is stated that the gold is being withdrawn for the purpose of "hoarding". The significance of this phrase becomes clearer when we reach Proclamation 2039, wherein the term "hoarding" is inserted into the amended version of Section 5(b). The term, "hoarding", was not to be found in the original version of Section 5(b) of the Act of October 6, 1917. It was a term which was used by President Roosevelt to help support his contention that the United States was in the middle of a national emergency, and his assertion that the extraordinary powers conferred to him by the War Powers Act were needed to deal with that emergency. Let us now go on to the middle of Proclamation 2039, at the top of the next page, Exhibit 33. In reading from Exhibit 33, we find the following: "Whereas, it is provided in Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, (40 Stat. L. 411) as amended, " that the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transaction in foreign exchange and the export, hoarding, melting, or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency * * * " exactly as was first proposed by the Federal Reserve Board of New York (Exhibit 31). If we return to 48 Statute 1 (Exhibit 17), Title 1, Section 1, we find that the amended Section 5 (b) with its added phrase: "by any person within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof". Is this becoming clearer as to exactly what happened? On March 5, 1933, President Roosevelt called for an extra session of Congress, and on March 6, 1933, issued Proclamation 2039 (Exhibits 32-33). On March 9th, Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2040. We looked at Proclamation 2039 on Exhibits 32 and 33, and now, on Exhibit 33 (a), let's see what Roosevelt is hiking about in Proclamation 2040: "Whereas, on March 6, 1933, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, by Proclamation declared the existence of a national emergency and proclaimed a bank holiday... " We see that Roosevelt declared a national emergency and a bank holiday. Let's read on: "Whereas, under the Act of March 9, 1933, all Proclamations heretofore or hereafter issued by the President pursuant to the authority conferred by section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, are approved and confirmed;" This section of the Proclamation clearly states that all proclamations heretofore or hereafter issued by the President are approved and confirmed, citing the authority of Section 5 (b). The key words here being "all" and "approved". Further: "Whereas, said national emergency still continues, and it is necessary to take further measures extending beyond March 9, 1933, in order to accomplish such purposes" We again clearly see that there is more to come, evidenced by the phrase, "further measures extending beyond March 9, 1933 ...". Could this be the beginning of a new deal? Possibly a one-sided deal. How long can this type of action continue? Let's find out. "Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, in view of such continuing national emergency and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411) as amended by the Act of March 9, 1933, do hereby proclaim, order, direct and declare that all the terms and provisions of said Proclamation of March 6, 1933, and the regulations and orders issued thereunder are hereby continued in full force and effect until further proclamation by the President." We now understand that the Proclamation 2039, of March 6, 1933 and Proclamation 2040 of March 9, 1933, will continue until such time as another proclamation is made by "the President". Note that the term "the President" is not specific to President Roosevelt; it is a generic term which can equally apply to any President from Roosevelt to the present, and beyond. So here we have President Roosevelt declaring a national emergency (we are now beginning to realize the full significance of those words) and closing the national banks for two days, by Executive Order. Further, he states that the Proclamations bringing about these actions will continue "in full force and effect" until such time as the President, and only the President, changes the situation. It is important to note the fact that these Proclamations were made on March 6, 1933, three days before Congress was due to convene its extra session. Yet references are made to such things as the amended Section 5 (b), which had not yet even been confirmed by Congress. President Roosevelt must have been supremely confident of Congress' confirmation of his actions. And indeed, we find that confidence was justified. For on March 9, 1933, without individual Congressmen even having the opportunity to read for themselves the bill they were to confirm, Congress did indeed approve the amendment of Section 5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917. Referring to the Public Papers of Herbert Hoover (Exhibit 34): "That those speculators and insiders were right was plain enough later on. This first contract of the 'moneychangers' with the New Deal netted those who removed their money from the country a profit of up to 60 percent when the dollar was debased." Where had our gold gone? Our gold had already been moved offshore. The gold was not in the banks, and when We, the People lined up at the door attempting to have our contracts honored, the deception was exposed. What happened then? The laws were changed to prevent us from asking again, and the military was brought in to protect the Federal Reserve. We, the People, were declared to be, the same as public enemy and placed under military authority. Going now to another section of 48 Statute 1 (Exhibit 35): "Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, such action is necessary to protect the currency system of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, in his discretion, may require any or all individuals, partnerships, associations and corporations to pay and deliver to the Treasurer of the United States any or all gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates owned by such individuals, partnerships, associations and corporations." By this Statute, everyone was required to turn in their gold. Failure to do so would constitute a violation of this provision, such violation to be punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than ten years. It was a seizure. Whose property may be seized without due process of law under the Trading With the Enemy Act? The enemy's. Whose gold was seized? Ours - the gold of the people of the United States. From the Roosevelt Papers (Exhibit 36): "During this banking holiday it was at first believed that some form of scrip or emergency currency would be necessary for the conduct of ordinary business. We knew that it would be essential when the banks reopened to have an adequate supply of currency to meet all possible demands of depositors. Consideration was given by government officials and various government officials and various local agencies to the advisability of issuing clearinghouse certificates or some similar form of local emergency currency. On March 7, 1933, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a regulation authorizing clearing houses to issue demand certificates against sound assets of the banking institutions, but this authority was not to become effective until March 10th. In many cities, the printing of these certificates was actually begun, but after the passage of the Emergency Banking Relief Act of March 9, 1933 (48 Stat. 1), it became evident that they would not be needed, because the Act made possible the issue of the necessary amount of emergency currency in the form of Federal Reserve banknotes which could be based on any sound assets owned by banks." Roosevelt could now issue emergency currency under the Act of March 9, 1933 and this currency was to be called Federal Reserve bank notes. From Title 4 of the Act of March 9, 1933 (Exhibit 37): "Upon the deposit with the Treasurer of the United States, (a) of any direct obligations of the United States or (b) of any notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or bankers' acceptances acquired under the provisions of this act, any Federal reserve bank making such deposit in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury shall be entitled to receive from the Comptroller of the currency circulating notes in blank, duly registered and countersigned." What is this saying? It says (emphasis added): "Upon the deposit with the Treasurer of the United States, (a) of any direct obligation of the United States ..." What is a direct obligation of the United States? It's a treasury note, which is an obligation upon whom? Upon "We the People" to perform. It's a taxpayer obligation, isn't it? Title 4 goes on: "or (b) of my notes, drafts, bills of exchange or bankers' acceptances..." What's a note? If you go to the bank and sign a note on your home, that's a note, isn't it? A note is a private obligation upon We, the People. And if the Federal Reserve Bank deposits either (a) public and/or (b) private obligation of We, the People, with the Treasury, the Comptroller of the currency will issue this circulating note endorsed in blank, duly registered and countersigned, an emergency currency based on the (a) public and/or (b) private obligations of the people of the United States. In the Congressional Record of March 9, 1933 (Exhibit 38), we find evidence that our congressmen didn't even have individual copies of the bill to read, on which they were about to vote. A copy of the bill was passed around for approximately 40 minutes. Congressman McFadden made the comment, "Mr. Speaker, I regret that the membership of the House has had no opportunity to consider or even read this bill. The first opportunity I had to know what this legislation is, was when it was read from the clerk's desk. It is an important banking bill. It is a dictatorship over finance in the United States. It is complete control over the banking system in the United States ... It is difficult under the circumstances to discuss this bill. The first section of the bill, as I grasped it, is practically the war powers that were given back in 1917." Congressman McFadden later says, "I would like to ask the chairman of the committee if this is a plan to change the holding of the security back of the Federal Reserve notes to the Treasury of the United States rather than the Federal Reserve agent." Keep in mind, here, that, prior to 1933, the Federal Reserve bank held our gold as security, in return for Federal Reserve gold notes which we could redeem at any time we wanted. Now, however, Congressman McFadden is asking if this proposed bill is a plan to change who's going to hold the security, from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury. Chairman Steagall's response to Congressman McFadden's question, again from the Congressional Record: "This provision is for the issuance of Federal Reserve bank notes; and not for Federal Reserve notes; and the security back of it is the obligations, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, bank acceptances, outlined in the section to which the gentleman has referred." We were backed by gold, and our gold was seized, wasn't it? We were penniless, and now our money would be secured, not by gold, but by notes and obligations on which We, the People, were the collateral security. Congressman McFadden then questioned, "Then the new circulation is to be Federal Reserve bank notes and not Federal Reserve notes. Is that true?" Mr. Steagall replied, "Insofar as the provisions of this section are concerned, yes." Does that sound familiar? Next we hear from Congressman Britten, as noted in the Congressional Record (Exhibit 39): "From my observations of the bill as it was read to the House, it would appear that the amount of bank notes that might be issued by the Federal Reserve System is not limited. That will depend entirely upon the amount of collateral that is presented from time to time for exchange for bank notes. Is that not correct?" Who is the collateral? We are chattel, aren't we? We have no rights. Our rights were suspended along with the Constitution. We became chattel property to the corporate government, our transactions and obligations the collateral for the issuance of Federal Reserve bank notes. Congressman Patman, speaking from the Congressional Record (Exhibit 40): "The money will be worth l00 cents on the dollar because it is backed by the credit of the Nation. It will represent a mortgage on all the homes and other property of all the people in the Nation." It now is no wonder that credit became so available after the Depression. It was needed to back our monetary system. Our debts, our obligations, our homes, our jobs... we were now slaves for the system. From Statutes at Large, in the Congressional Record (Exhibit 41): "When required to do so by the Secretary of the Treasury, each Federal Reserve agent shall act as agent of the Treasurer of the United States or of the Comptroller of the currency, or both, for the performance of any functions which the Treasurer or the Comptroller may be called upon to perform in carrying out the provisions of this paragraph." The Federal Reserve was taken over by the Treasury. The Treasury holds the assets. We are the collateral... ourselves and our property. To summarize briefly: On March 9, 1933 the American people in all their domestic, daily, and commercial transactions became the same as the enemy. The President of the United States, through licenses or any other form, was given the power to regulate and control the actions of enemies. He made We, the People, chattel property; he seized our gold, our property and our rights; and he suspended the Constitution. And we know that current law, to this day, says that all proclamations issued heretofore or hereafter by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury are approved and confirmed by Congress. Pretty broad, sweeping approval to be automatic, wouldn't you agree? On March 11, 1933, President Roosevelt, in his first radio "Fireside Chat" (Exhibit 42), makes the following statement: "The Secretary of the Treasury will issue licenses to banks which are members of the Federal Reserve system, whether national bank or state, located in each of the 12 Federal Reserve bank cities, to open Monday morning." It was by this action that the Treasury took over the banking system. Black's Law Dictionary defines the Bank Holiday of 1933 (Exhibit 42a) in the following words: "Presidential Proclamations No. 2039, issued March 6, 1933, and No. 2040, issued March 9, 1933, temporarily suspended banking transactions by member banks of the Federal Reserve System. Normal banking functions were resumed on March 13, subject to certain restrictions. The first proclamation, it was held, had no authority in law until the passage on March 9, 1933, of a ratifying act (12 U.S.C.A. Sect. 95b). Anthony v. Bank of Wiggins, 183 Miss. 883, 184 So. 626. The present law forbids member banks of the Federal Reserve System to transact banking business, except under regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, during an emergency proclaimed by the President. 12 U. S. C. A. Sect. 95" Take special note of the last sentence of this definition, especially the phrase, "present law". The fact that banks are under regulation of the Treasury today, is evidence that the state of emergency still exists, by virtue of the definition. Not that, at this point, we need any more evidence to prove we are still in a declared state of national emergency. From the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933 (Exhibit 43): "To issue licenses permitting processors, associations of producers and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product thereof." This is the seizure of the agricultural industry by means of licensing authority. In the first hundred days of the reign of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, similar seizures by licensing authority were successfully completed by the government over a plethora of other industries, among them transportation, communications, public utilities, securities, oil, labor, and all natural resources. The first hundred days of FDR saw the nationalization of the United States, its people and its assets. What has Bill Clinton talked about during his campaign and early presidency? His first hundred days. Now, we know that they took over all contracts, for we have already read in Exhibit 22: "No contract is considered as valid as between enemies, at least so far as to give them a remedy in the courts of law of either government, and they have, in the language of civil law, no ability to sustain a persona standi in judicio." They have no personal nights at law. Therefore, we should expect that we would see in the statutes a time when the contract between the, Federal Reserve and We, the People, in which the Federal Reserve had to give us our gold on demand, was made null and void. Referring to House Joint Resolution 192 (June 5, 1933) (Exhibit 44): "That (a) every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular- kind of coin or currency, or in an amount of money of the United States measured thereby is declared to be against public policy; and no such policy shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred." Indeed, our contract with the Federal Reserve was invalidated at the end of Roosevelt's hundred days. We lost our night to require our gold back from the bank in which we had deposited it. Returning once again to the Roosevelt Papers (Exhibit 45): "This conference of fifty farm leaders met on March 10, 1933. They agreed on recommendations for a bill, which were presented to me at the White House on March 11th by a committee of the conference, who requested me to call upon the Congress for the same broad powers to meet the emergency in agriculture as I had requested for solving the bank crisis." What was the "broad powers"? That was the War Powers, wasn't it? And now we see the farm leaders asking President Roosevelt to use the same War Powers to take control of the agricultural industry. Well, needless to say, he did. We should wonder about all that took place at this conference, for it to result in the eventual acquiescence of farm leadership to the governmental takeover of their livelihoods. Reading from the Agricultural Adjustment Act, May the 12th, Declaration of Emergency (Exhibit 46): "That the present acute economic emergency being in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the prices of agriculture and other commodities, which disparity bas largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange of commodities, and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets supporting the national credit structure, it is hereby declared that these conditions in the basic industry of agriculture have affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest, have burdened and obstructed the normal currents of commerce in such commodities and rendered imperative the immediate enactment of Title 1 of this act." Now here we see that he is saying that the agricultural assets support the national credit structure. Did he take the titles of all the land? Remember "Contracts payable in gold!" President Roosevelt needed the support, and agriculture was critical, because of all the millions of acres of farmland at that time, and the value of that farmland. The mortgage on that farmland was what supported the emergency credit. So President Roosevelt had to do something to stabilize the price of land and Federal Reserve Bank notes to create money, didn't he? So he impressed agriculture into the public interest. The farming industry was nationalized. Continuing with the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Declaration of Emergency (Exhibit 47): "It is hereby declared to the public policy of Congress ..." Referring now back to Prize Cases (1862) (2 Black, 674) (Exhibit 24): "But in defining the meaning of the term 'enemies' property,' we will be led into error if we refer to Fleta or Lord Coke for their definition of the word, 'enemy'. It is a technical phrase peculiar to prize courts, and depends upon principles of public policy as distinguished from the common law." Once the emergency is declared, the common law is abolished, the Constitution is abolished and we fall under the absolute will of Government, public policy. All the government needs to continue is to have public opinion on their side. If public opinion can be kept, in sufficient degree, on the side of the government, statutes, laws and bills can continue to be passed. The Constitution has no meaning. The Constitution is suspended. It has been for 60 years. We're not under law. Law has been abolished. We're under a system of public policy, (War Powers). So when you go into that courtroom with your Constitution and the common law in your hand, what does that judge tell you? He tells you that you have no persona standi in judicio. You have no personal standing at law. He tells you not to bother bringing the Constitution into his court, because it is not a Constitutional court, but an executive tribunal operating under a totally different jurisdiction. From Section 93-549 (Exhibit 48) (emphasis added): "Under this procedure we retain Government by law, special, temporary law, perhaps, but law nonetheless. The public may know the extent and the limitations of the powers that can be asserted, and the persons affected may be informed by the statute of their rights and their duties." If you have any rights, the only reason you have them is because they have been statutorily declared, and your duties well spelled out, and if you violate the orders of those statutes, you will be charged, not with a crime, but with an offense. Again from 93-549, from the words of Mr. Katzenbach (Exhibit 49): "My recollection is that almost every executive order ever issued straddles on several grounds, but it almost always includes the Trading With the Enemy Act because the language of that act Is so broad, it would 'justify almost anything." Speaking on the subject of a challenge to the Act by the people, Justice Clark then says, "Most difficult from a standpoint of standing to sue. The Court, you might say, has enlarged the standing rule in favor of the litigant. But I don't think it has reached the point, presently, that would permit many such cases to be litigated to the merits." Senator Church then made the comment: "What you're saying, then, is that if Congress doesn't act to standardize, restrict, or eliminate the emergency powers, that no one else is very likely to get a standing in court to contest." No persona standi n judicio, - no personal standing in the courts. Continuing with Senate Report 93-549 (Exhibit 50): "The interesting aspect of the legislation lies in the fact that it created a permanent agency designed to eradicate an emergency condition in the sphere of agriculture." These agencies, of which there are now thousands, and which now control every aspect of our lives, were ostensibly created as temporary agencies meant to last only as long as the national emergency. They have become, in fact, permanent agencies, as has the state of national emergency itself. As Franklin Delano Roosevelt said: "We will never go back to the old order." That quote takes on a different meaning in light of what we have seen so far. In Exhibit 51, Senate Report 93-549, we find a quote from Senator Church: "If the President can create crimes by fiat and without congressional approval, our system is not much different from that of the Communists, which allegedly threatens our existence." We see on this same document, at the bottom right-hand side of the page, as a Title, the words, "Enormous Scope of Powers... A Time Bomb". Remember, this is Congress' own document, from the year 1973. Most people might not look to agriculture to provide them with this type of information. But let us look at Title III of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which is also called the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 (Exhibit 52): "Title III - Financing - And Exercising Power Conferred by Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution: To Coin Money And To Regulate the Value Thereof." From Section 43 of Exhibit 52: "Whenever the President finds upon investigation that the foreign commerce of the United States is adversely affected ... and an expansion of credit is necessary to secure by international agreement a stabilization at proper levels of the currencies of various governments, the President is authorized, in his discretion ... To direct the Secretary of the Treasury to enter into agreements with the several Federal Reserve banks..." Remember that in the Constitution it states that Congress has the authority to coin all money and regulate the value thereof. How can it be then that the Executive branch is issuing an emergency currency, and quoting the Constitution as its authority to do so? Under Section 1 of the same Act (Exhibit 53) we find the following: "To direct the Secretary of the treasury to cause to be issued in such amount or amounts as he may from time to time order, United States notes, as provided in the Act entitled "An Act to authorize the issue of United States notes and for the redemption of funding thereof and for funding the floating debt of the United States, approved February 25, 1862, and Acts supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof" What is the Act of February 25, 1862? It is the Greenback Act of President Abraham Lincoln. Let us remember that, when Abraham Lincoln was elected and inaugurated, he didn't even have a Congress for the first six weeks. He did not, however, call an extra session of Congress. He issued money, he declared war, he suspended habeas corpus, it was an absolute Constitutional dictatorship. There was not even a Congress in session for six weeks. When Lincoln's Congress came into session six weeks later, they entered the following statement into the Congressional record: "The actions, rules, regulations, licenses, heretofore or hereafter taken, are hereby approved and confirmed..." This is the exact language of March 9, 1933 and Title 12, USC, Section 95(b), today. We now come to the question of how to terminate these extraordinary powers granted under a declaration of national emergency. We have learned that, in order for the extraordinary powers to be terminated, the national emergency itself must be canceled. Reading from the Agricultural Act, Section 13 (Exhibit 54): "This title shall cease to be in effect whenever the President finds and proclaims that the national economic emergency in relation to agriculture has been ended." Whenever the President finds by proclamation that the proclamation issued on March 6, 1933 has terminated, it has to terminate through presidential proclamation just as it came into effect. Congress had already delegated all of that authority, and therefore was in no position to take it back. In Senate Report 93-549, we find the following statement from Congress (Exhibit 55): "Furthermore, it would be largely futile task unless we have the President's active collaboration. Having delegated this authority to the President in ways that permit him to determine how long it shall continue, simply through the device of keeping emergency declarations alive - we now find ourselves in a position where we cannot reclaim the power without the President's acquiescence. We are unable to terminate these declarations without the President's signature, so we need a large measure of Presidential cooperation". It appears that no president has been willing to give up this extraordinary power, and, if they will not sign the termination proclamation, the access to, and usage of, extraordinary powers does not terminate. At least, it has not terminated for over 60 years. Now, that's no definite indication that a President from Bill Clinton on might not eventually sign the termination proclamation, but 60 years of experience would lead one to doubt that day will ever come by itself But the question now to ask is this: How many times have We, the People, asked the President to terminate his access to extraordinary powers, or the situation on which it is based, the declared national emergency? Who has ever demanded that this be done? How many of us even knew that it had been done? And, without the knowledge contained in this report, how long do you think the blindness of the American public to this situation would have continued, and with it the abolishment of the Constitution? But we're not quite as in the dark as we were, are we? In Senate Report 93-549 (Exhibit 56), we find the following statement from Senator Church: "These powers, if exercised, would confer upon the President total authority to do anything he pleased." Elsewhere in Senate Report 93-549, Senator Church makes the remarkable statement (Exhibit 57): "Like a loaded gun laying around the house, the plethora of delegated authority and institutions to meet almost every kind of conceivable crisis stand ready for use for purposes other than their original intention ... Machiavelli, in his "Discourses of Livy," acknowledged that great power may have to be given to the Executive if the State is to survive, but warned of great dangers in doing so. He cautioned: Nor is it sufficient if this power be conferred upon good men; for men are frail, and easily corrupted, and then in a short time, he that is absolute may easily corrupt the people." Now, a quote from an exclusive reply (Exhibit 58) written May 21, 1973, by the Attorney General of the United States regarding studies undertaken by the Justice Department on the question of the termination of the standing national emergency: "As a consequence, a "national emergency" is now a practical necessity in order to carry out what has become the regular and normal method of governmental actions. What were intended by Congress as delegations of power to be used only in the most extreme situations, and for the most limited duration's, have become everyday powers, and a state of "emergency" has become a permanent condition." From United States v. Butler (Supreme Court, 1935) (Exhibit 59): "A tax, in the general understanding and in the strict Constitutional sense, is an exaction for the support of government; the term does not connote the expropriation of money from one group to be expended for another, as a necessary means in a plan of regulation, such as the plan for regulating agricultural production set up in the Agricultural Adjustment Act." What is being said here is that a tax can only be an exaction for the support of government, not for an expropriation from one group for the use of another. That would be socialism, wouldn't it? Quoting further from United States v. Butler (Exhibit 60): "The regulation of farmer's activities under the statute, though in form subject to his own will, is in fact coercion through economic pressure; his right of choice is illusory. Even if a farmer's consent were purely voluntary, the Act would stand no better. At best it is a scheme for purchasing with federal funds submission to federal regulation of a subject reserved to the states." Speaking of contracts, those contracts are coercion contracts. They are adhesion contracts made by a superior over an inferior. They are under the belligerent capacity of government over enemies. They are not valid contracts. Again from United States v. Butler (Exhibit 61): "If the novel view of the General Welfare Clause now advanced in support of the tax were accepted, this clause would not only enable Congress to supplant the states in the regulation of agriculture and all other industries as well, but would furnish the means whereby all of the other provisions of the Constitution, sedulously framed to define and limit the powers of the United States and preserve the powers of the states, could be broken down, the independence of the individual states obliterated, and the United States converted into a central government exercising uncontrolled police power throughout the union superseding all local control over local concerns." Please, read the above paragraph again. The understanding of its meaning is vital. The United States Supreme Court ruled the New Deal, the nationalization, unconstitutional in the Agricultural Adjustment Act and they turned it down flat. The Supreme Court declared it to be unconstitutional. They said, in effect, "You're turning the federal government into an uncontrolled police state, exercising uncontrolled police power." What did Roosevelt do next? He stacked the Supreme Court, didn't he? And in 1937, United States v. Butler was overturned. From the 65th Congress, 1st Session Doc. 87, under the section entitled Constitutional Sources of Laws of War, Page 7, Clause II, we find (Exhibit 62): "The existence of war and the restoration of peace are to be determined by the political department of the government, and such determination is binding and conclusive upon the courts, and deprives the courts of the power of hearing proof and determining as a question of fact either that war exists or has ceased to exist." The courts will tell you that is a political question, for they (the courts) do not have jurisdiction over the common law. The courts were deprived of the Constitution. They were deprived of the common law. There are now courts of prize over the enemies, and we have no persona standi in judicio. We have no personal standing under the law. Also from the 65th Congress, under the section entitled Constitutional Sources of Laws of War, we find (Exhibit 63): "When the sovereign authority shall choose to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will. But until that will shall be expressed, no power of condemnation can exist in the court." From Senate Report 93-549 (Exhibit 64): "Just how effective a limitation on crisis action this makes of the court is hard to say. In light of the recent war, the court today would seem to be a fairly harmless observer of the emergency activities of the President and Congress. It is highly unlikely that the separation of powers and the 10th Amendment will be called upon again to hamstring the efforts of the government to deal resolutely with a serious national emergency." So much for our Constitutional system of checks and balances. And from that same Senate Report, in the section entitled, "Emergency Administration", a continuation of Exhibit 64: "Organizationally, in dealing with the depression, it was Roosevelt's general policy to assign new, emergency functions to newly created agencies, rather than to already existing departments." Thus, thousands of "temporary" emergency agencies, are now sitting out there with emergency functions to rule us in all cases whatsoever. Finally, let us look briefly at the courts, specifically with regard to the question of "booty". The following definition of the term, "prize" is to be found in Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Exhibit 65): "Goods taken on land from a public enemy are called booty; and the distinction between a prize and booty consists in this, that the former is taken at sea and the latter on land." This significance of the distinction between these two terms is critical, a fact which will become quite clear shortly. Let us now remember that "Congress shall have the power to make rules on all captures on the land and the water." To reiterate, captures on the land are booty, and captures on the water are prize. Now, the Constitution says that Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a navy, even during peacetime. It also says that Congress shall have the power to raise and support an army, but no appropriations of money for that purpose shall be for greater than two years. Here we can see that an army is not a permanent standing body, because, in times of peace, armies were held by the sovereign states as militia. So the United States had a navy during peacetime, but no standing army; we had instead the individual state militias. Consequently, the federal government had a standing prize court, due to the fact that it had a standing navy, whether in times of peace or war. But in times of peace, there could be no federal police power over the continental United States, because there was to be no army. From the report The Law of Civil Government in Territory Subject to Military Occupation by Military Forces of the United States, published by order of the Secretary of War in 1902, under the heading entitled The Confiscation of Private Property of Enemies in War (Exhibit 66), comes the following quote: "4. Should the President desire to utilize the services of the Federal courts of the United States in promoting this purpose or military undertaking, since these courts derive their jurisdiction from Congress and do not constitute a part of the military establishment, they must secure from Congress the necessary action to confer such jurisdiction upon said courts." This means that, if the government is going to confiscate property within the continental United States on the land (booty), it must obtain statutory authority. In this same section (Exhibit 66), we find the following words: "5. The laws and usage's of war make a distinction between enemies' property captured on the sea and property captured on land. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over property captured at sea is held not to attach to property captured on land in the absence of Congressional action." There is no standing prize court over the land. Once war is declared, Congress must give jurisdiction to particular courts over captures on the land by positive Congressional action. To continue with (Exhibit 66): "The right of confiscation is a sovereign right. In times of peace, 

Back to Top


What is "Voluntary" ?

John Jay Center for American LawThe Shackles of "Voluntary Compliance"
The Real Story Behind the Federal Tax System
by Greg Loren, Durand suijuris
This Country's Two Distinct Citizenships
The "people" and "citizens" referred to in the Bill of Rights are the same as 
the "persons" and "citizens" referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment.
This statement is false. Black's Law Dictionary states:
  "The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, ratified 
  in 1868, creates or at least recognizes for the first time a citizenship of 
  the United States, as distinct from that of the states." (1)
 This fact has been acknowledged by countless court cases throughout the history 
of American jurisprudence, including United States v. Cruikshank (1875):
  "We have in our political system a government of the United States and a 
  government of each of the several states. Each one of these governments is 
  distinct from the others and each has citizens of its own who owe it 
  allegiance, and whose rights,within its jurisdiction, it must protect." (2)
 In reality, there are two distinct citizenships in this country: free-born 
Citizens of the states, and secondary subjects of the federal government known 
as "citizens of the United States." The former are classified by law as 
"domiciles" of their respective states (their "legal home" (3)); the latter are 
merely "residents" within each state, (4) for their "legal home" is in the 
District of Columbia.
U.S. Citizens Are Not Protected by the Bill of Rights
"[C]itizens of the United States" (Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1) are 
protected by the Bill of Rights.
This statement is false. Again, we turn to the rulings of the courts to 
substantiate our answer. According to the Slaughter House Cases of 1873:
  "[T]he distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of 
  a state is clearly recognized andestablished.... The language [of the 
  Fourteenth Amendment] is, 'No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
  abridge theprivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' It is a 
  little remarkable, if this clause were intended as a protection to the Citizen 
  of the state against the legislative power of his own state, that the word 
  Citizen of the state should be left out when it is so carefully used, and used 
  in contradistinction to citizens of the United States, in the very sentence 
  which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that the change in phraseology 
  was adopted understandingly and with a purpose.... [W]e wish to state here 
  that it is only the former which are placed by this clause under the 
  protection of [the Fourteenth Amendment to] the federal Constitution, and that 
  the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional 
  protection by this paragraph of the amendment...." (5)
 In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment granted what are known as "civil 
rights" to the newly created citizenship of the United States government, 
because they were not protected by the Bill of Rights, which apply only to 
Citizens of the states. This fact has been recognized as recently as 1993 in 
Jones v. Temmer:
  "The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
  very few rights because it neitherincorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor 
  protects all rights of individual [U.S.] citizens. Instead, this provision 
  protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal 
  government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state 
  citizenship." (6)

The Question of Federal Jurisdiction
Citizens of the several states are under the jurisdiction of federal law (Acts 
of Congress).
 This statement is false. As noted above in the quote from United States v. 
Cruikshank, each class of citizen is subject to the jurisdiction of his own 
government. Jurisdiction has a very precise legal definition as an "area of 
authority." (7) Generally, jurisdiction is a geographical term and limits the 
exercise of authority to a specific location. This is known as "lex loci," or 
"the law of the place." (8) According to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
  "'Act of Congress' includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in 
  force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an 
  insular possession." (9)
 This means that federal law applies only to those who live (domicile) within 
Washington, D.C. (incorporated in 1982 as "The State of New Columbia" (10)) or 
in a federal zone or territory. Since the several states are not federal 
territories, they do not exist within federal jurisdiction, but act as sovereign 
legal entities. (11) However, the creation of what are known as "political 
subdivisions" (12) within the boundaries of the states, enables Congress to 
enforce its laws to a limited extentwithin what otherwise would be foreign 
territories to the "ten miles square" (13) of the District of Columbia. This is 
known as "lex loci contractus," which means that "the law of the place" may 
apply to other places through legal contract. (14)
 Those people who are Fourteenth Amendment federal citizens are considered to be 
"territorial property" (15) and "corporate franchises" (16) of Washington, D.C. 
and are under the jurisdiction of federal law, regardless of where they 
"reside." State Citizens, on the other hand, are "non-resident aliens" (17) with 
regards to the federal government and are subject only to the legislatures of 
their respective states, which are "foreign countries" (18) to the District of 
Columbia. State Citizens areno more bound to obey "Acts of Congress" than are 
citizens of France.
How Americans Unknowingly Enter Federal Jurisdiction
The terms "Colorado" and "State of Colorado" and the abbreviations "Colo." and 
"CO" are synonymous in the eyes of the federal government.
 This statement is false. The truth is that these terms and abbreviations are 
very different in meaning. According to the 43rd Congress:
 "The word 'State' shall be construed to include [mean] the Territories and the 
District of Columbia.... (19)
 This definition has not changed to this day, for Title 26 of the United States 
Code (the Internal Revenue Code) states very clearly that the term "'State' 
shall be construed to include[mean] the District of Columbia...." (20) Rule 
54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted above, also defines 
"State" in this way. Therefore, in American law, the term "State of Colorado," 
or the abbreviation "CO," is to be distinguishedfrom "Colorado," or the 
abbreviation "Colo." The former refers to a "political subdivision" of the 
District of Columbia, while the latter refers to the sovereign state admitted to 
the Union in 1876. This is not just a game of semantics, but is a matter of very 
real legal consequence. When one signs a legal document of the "State of 
Colorado" or completes his home address with CO (followed by a zip code), he is, 
in a very real sense, creating a legal "nexus" (21) between himself and the 
District of Columbia, thereby placing himself under the jurisdiction of federal 
law. As far as the federal government is concerned, he is to be taken at his 
word that he is not a free-born state Citizen, but a second-class Fourteenth 
Amendment citizen "subject to the jurisdiction" (22) of the U.S. government.
The Internal Revenue Service and Tax Liability
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not consider all attempts to avoid tax 
liability to be criminal offenses.
 This statement is true. According to the Internal Revenue Code:
  "Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the collection 
  thereof, shall keep such records, render suchstatements, make such returns, 
  and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to 
  time prescribe." (23)
  "When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person made 
  liable for any tax imposed by this title, or withrespect to the collection 
  thereof, shall make a return or statement according to the forms and 
  regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Every person required to make a 
  return or statement shall include the information required by such forms or 
  regulations." (24)
 What most Americans do not know is that the persons "made liable" to the 
Internal Revenue Code are, for the most part, Fourteenth Amendment citizens. 
(25) As noted above, U.S. citizens are considered by law to be "corporate 
franchises" of the District of Columbia, and therefore are expected to pay a tax 
in exchange for this "privilege." This is why the federal income tax is known as 
"internal revenue"-- it is "internal," or "comprised within the boundary 
lines... [and] domestic" (26) to the federal territories, and therefore 
"foreign," or "subject to another jurisdiction" (27) with regards to the several 
states. Therefore,U.S. citizens are subject to the taxation laws; state Citizens 
are not.
 So is avoidance of taxation a criminal offense? According to our own legal 
system, it is not:
  "The legal rights of the taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise 
  would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means the law permits cannot 
  be doubted." (28)
 Even the IRS will openly admit that avoidance of taxation is not a criminal 
offense, but a "right of the taxpayer": 
  "Avoidance of tax is not a criminal offense. All taxpayers have the right to 
  reduce, avoid, or minimize their taxes bylegitimate means. The distinction 
  between avoidance and evasion is fine, yet definite. One who avoids tax does 
  not conceal ormisrepresent, but shapes and preplans events to reduce or 
  eliminate tax liability, then reports the transactions. Evasion, on the other 
  hand, involves deceit, subterfuge, camouflage, concealment, some attempts to 
  color or obscure events, or making things seem other than they are." (29)
 According to the 1992 Forms and 1040 Instructions booklet, published by the 
IRS, each person who files an income tax return is "among the millions of 
Americans who comply with the tax law voluntarily." (30) Even the statutes 
dealing with Form W-4 (which most workers are presented by their employers when 
they are hired) make it clear that "the furnishing of such Form W-4 shall 
constitute a request for withholding." (31) This is what is known as "voluntary 
compliance," or "to yield... to adapt oneself to; to act in accordance with... 
unconstrained... acting of oneself." (32) The Supreme Court itself has declared 
that "our tax system is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon 
distraint." (33)
 How then have millions of free-born American Citizens been made to voluntarily 
comply with the monstrous tax system? Simply because the IRS has written its 
voluminous tax laws in such a way that the average American, who does not have a 
knowledge of the distinct citizenships that exist in this country, will believe 
that the terms "U.S. Individual," "U.S. Taxpayer," "Resident of the United 
States," etc. actually refer to him and will act accordingly. According to the 
ruling of Guardian T&D Co. v. Fisher (1906):
  "An individual may be under no obligation to do a particular thing, and his 
  failure to act creates no liability, but if hevoluntarily attempts to act and 
  do the particular thing he comes under an implied obligation." (34)
 In other words, signing your name to Form 1040 is to "create an obligation" 
(35) to accept a tax debt which, in most cases, would not have existed 
otherwise. In a 1969 ruling of the Supreme Court, it was stated:
  "Only the rare taxpayer would be likely to know that he could refuse to 
  produce his records to IRS agents." (36)
 There is simply no law that requires any American to file a tax return each 
year on April 15th, as this would amount to a forfeiture of the Fourth 
Amendment's guarantee of "the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," and the Fifth 
Amendment's protection against "self-incrimination." (37) An American Citizen 
cannot be "compelled... to be a witness against himself," but he can certainly 
volunteer to do so. This is why such stress is placed upon "voluntary 
compliance" in IRS publications. 
The Moral Implications of Tax Avoidance
It is a moral and American duty to pay income tax to the IRS.
 This statement is false. Again, let us quote the Supreme Court:
"Because of what appears to be a lawful command on the surface, many citizens, 
because of their respect for what onlyappears to be law, are cunningly coerced 
into waiving their rights due to ignorance." (38)
 As tax season approaches each year, the American public is literally barraged 
by the media with exhortations to pay their "fair share" of taxes. Accompanying 
these are usually stories that depict the IRS as a stern, but fair, enforcer of 
the law against "tax evaders." The IRS itself never has to spend a dime on 
public relations, for all it has to do is rely upon such free advertisement and 
exploit the natural desire of most honest Americans to "obey the law" in order 
to continue its charade.Even many well-meaning religious leaders contribute to 
this illusion by telling their congregations that it is a sin not to "pay taxes 
to whom taxes are due" (Romans 13:7). However, what each of us needs to realize 
is that it is not illegal, much less immoral, to refuse to comply with a law 
that does not apply to us. In the Bible we are told, "[W]here there is no law 
there is no transgression" (Romans 4:15). This is an abiding legal principle 
that even "secular" courts will readily accept:
  "The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form 
  and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void and ineffective for 
  any purpose.... An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as 
  inoperative as if it had never been passed.
  "Since an unconstitutional law is void... it imposes no duties... No one is 
  bound to obey an unconstitutional law, and nocourts are bound to enforce it." 

Endnotes and Documentation
1. Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing Company, 1990; SixthEdition), p. 657.
2. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 588, 590.
3. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 484.
4. Ibid., pp. 1308-1309.
5. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394.
6. Jones v. Temmer, 829 F. Supp. 1226.
7. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 853.
8. Ibid., p. 911.
9. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 54(c).
10. Title 28 USC 3002(15)(a) clearly defines the District ofColumbia (United 
States) as a "federal corporation."
11. Glass v. The Sloop Betsy, 3 Dall 6; 1794.
12. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1159.
13. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
14. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 911.
15. Ibid., p. 1473.
16. Ibid., p. 339.
17. Ibid., p. 1057.
18. 26 CFR 1.911-2h.
19. Title 25, Internal Revenue, Chapter 1, p. 601, Revised Statutes of the 
United States, 1863-1864. I have placed the word "mean" in brackets, not to 
change the meaning of the sentence, but to clarify it. In law, "include" most 
often is used as a term of limitation. In other words, if something is not 
included, it is excluded.
20. 26 USC 7701(a)(10).
21. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1044.
22. U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.
23. 26 USC 6001.
24. 26 USC 6001(a).
25. There are a few exceptions to this rule, which cannot be enumerated here due 
to space constraints.
26. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 815.
27. Ibid., p. 646.
28. Gregory v. Helvring, 293 U.S. 465, 469.
29. Internal Revenue Service Manual, p. 4231-161.
30. 1992 Forms and 1040 Instructions, p. 3.
31. 26 CFR 3402(p)1(b)(1)(i).
32. Black's Law Dictionary, pp. 286, 1575.
33. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145.
34. Guardian T&D Co. v. Fisher, 26 SCt. 186 at 188.
35. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 322.
36. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111.
37. Actually, the term "self-incrimination" does not appear in the Fifth 
Amendment and is somewhat misleading, for it implies that there has in fact been 
a crime committed to which the person is not required to confess.
38. U.S. v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187.
39. Sixteenth American Jurisprudence (Second Edition), Section177.
Common Law Copyright 1995
Greg Loren, Durand suijuris
Permission to copy and distribute the preceding article is hereby granted 
provided that it is reproduced in its entirety and without alteration. 
The information in the preceding article is not intended for purposes of 
rendering legal or other professional advice. We in no way advocate evasion of 
legitimate or constitutional taxes, or the nonpayment of any lawfully owed debt.
Back to home Page
Back to Top


What is Admiralty ?

There are three classes of cases for which the Constitution
grants power to the judiciary.
"1.Cases in law, or suits at common law, wherein legal right
are to be ascertained, and legal remedies administered according to
the old and established proceedings at common law.
"2. Cases r suits in equity where equitable rights only are
recognized, and equitable remedies administered.
"3.Cases or suits in the admiralty, where there is a mixture
of public or maritime law and of equity in the same suit."
(Jurisdiction)	Bains v. The Scooner James and Catherine, Federal
Vases 576.
"The judicial power of the United States extends to all the
cases enumerated in the third article of the constitution, but to
none other; ... it is not cognizable by the courts of the United
States, unless it represents a case arising under the constitution,
laws, or treaties of the union, or is a subject of equity,
admiralty, or maritime jurisdiction.  Bains supra p. 546
"It remains to inquire whether they have, by the same
instrument, (constitution) enlarged the civil jurisdiction of the
admiralty, so as to extend it to causes arising within the body of
a country, which were cognizable exclusively by the courts of
common law in England."  Bains, supra, p. 554
"It is well known, that in civil causes, in the courts of
equity and admiralty, juries to not intervene, and that the courts
of equity use the trial by jury only in extraordinary cases to
inform the conscience of the court.  Bains. supra. p. 555
"The civil law does not distinguish cases at law from cases in
"The common law is the standard by which to ascertain what are
proper cases for a prohibition to a court of admiralty, and not the
civil law: ... Bains, supra. p. 56
"And as every robbery on land includes a trespass, so does
every piracy at sea."  (Admiralty) 1 Com. Dig. 268.  Talbot v.
Janson, supra. p. 139
"And the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity,
and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to
the civil law.	Wayman and another v. Sourthard and another, 10
Wall 1, p. 317.
"And the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity,
and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to
the civil law.	Wayman and another v. Southard and another, 10 Wall
1, p. 317.
"The difference between departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary
construes the law;... (Congress) Wayman v. Sourthard, supra, p. 327
"I think it is high time to check this silent and stealing
progress of the admiralty in acquiring jurisdiction to which it has
no pretensions.  Ramsey v. Allegrie, 12 Wall 611, p. 396
"Admiralty before the time of richard II., had arrogated to
itself a scope of judicial, legislative, and ministerial power
which withdrew from the trial by jury, and placed under the
surveillance of the crown, of which the admiralty was only
representative, more than half the jurisprudence, of the kingdom.
Ramsey v. allegrie, supra, p. 398.
The constitution of the United States protects the citizens
from unconstitutional laws to limit admiralty so that it:
"could then no longer prescribe its own limits in
prejudice of the individual, and to the exclusion of the common-law
rights."  Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 399
In England admiralty was constrained however:
"...when the increase of commerce and the weak reign of
the Stuarts presented a motive and an opportunity, that the
attention of the nation was attracted to the usurpations and
unconstitutional power exercised by that court."  Ramsey v.
Allegrie, supra, p. 401.
"Brown, Vol. 2, 100, lays down the rule in these terms:  'The
general rule, however, at present, is, that the admiralty acts only
in rem, and that no person can be subject to that jurisdiction but
by his consent, expressed by his entering into a stipulation.'"
Ramsey v. Allegrie, spur, p. 409.
"In Kreble's Reports, p. 500, quoted by Brown, it is expressly
said, that without a stipulation, the admiralty has no jurisdiction
at all over the person."  Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 410.
"If the common law can try the cause, and give full redress,
that alone takes away the admiralty jurisdiction."  Ramsey v.
Allegrie, supra, p. 411.
"Let the cases be searched from the remotest period down to
the time of Menetone v. Gibbons, 3 T. R. 267, and the ground of
prohibition, and of recovery, under the 2d of Henry IV. will
uniformly be found to be competency of the common law to enforce
the contract.  This is the principle by which even their
jurisdiction in rem is controlled, and it hence follows, that in no
cases in which they are prohibited from proceeding in rem, can they
have the action in personam."  (Admiralty)  ramsey v. Allegrie,
supra, p. 417.
"Every advance of the admiralty is a victory over the common
law; a conquest gained upon the trial by jury.	The principles upon
which alone this suit could have been maintained, are equally
applicable to one half the commercial contracts between citizen and
citizen.  Once establish the rights here claimed, and it may bring
back with it all the admiralty usurpations of the fifteenth
century.  Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 418.
"I, therefore, hold that we are under a peculiar obligation to
restrain the admiralty jurisdiction within its proper limits."
Ramsey v. Allegrie, supra, p. 418.
"The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in
contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime
jurisdiction."  Parsons v. Bedford, et al, 3 Pet 433, 478-9.
"It is well known that in civil cases, in courts of equity and
admiralty, juries do not intervene, and that courts of equity use
the trial by jury only in extraordinary cases to inform the
conscience of the court."  Parsons v. Bedford, et al, 3 Pet 433,
"By common law, they (framers of 7th Amendment) meant what the
constitution denominated in the third article 'law;' not merely
suits which the common law recognized among its old and settled
proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained
and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered; or where, as in the admiralty, mixture of public law
and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same suit.
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet 433, 479 (1830)
"And if the admiralty jurisdiction, in matters of contract and
tort which the courts of the United States may lawfully exercise on
the high seas, can be extended to the lakes under the power to
regulate commerce, it can with the same propriety and upon the same
construction, be extended to contracts and torts on land when the
commerce is between different states.  And it may embrace also the
vehicles and persons engaged in carrying it on.  (Roads) The
Genesee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p.   .
"But if the power of regulating commerce can be the foundation
of jurisdiction in its courts, and a new and extended admiralty
jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and admitted limits, may
be created on water under that authority, the same reason would
justify the same exercise of power on land."  (Roads) The Genesee
Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p.  .
"It is evident that a definition that would at this day limit
public rivers in this country to tide-water rivers is utterly
inadmissible.  We have thousands of miles of public navigable
water, including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide.  And
certainly there can be no reason for admiralty power over a public
tide-water, which does not apply with equal force to any
other public water used for commercial purposes and foreign trade.
The lakes and the waters connecting them are undoubtedly public
waters; and we think are within the grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction in the Constitution of the United States.	The Genesee
Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p.  .
"If the water was navigable it was deemed to be public; and if
public, was regarded as within the legitimate scope of the
admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution."  Genesee
Chief, et al. v. Fitzhugh, 12 How 443, p.    .
All civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over
"extends over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be
made or executed, or wheresoever may be the form of the
stipulations) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce
of the sea.
Admiralty proceeds according to the course of the civil law,
and that an appeal, and not a writ of error, lies from its decrees.
De Lovio v. Boit et al., 2 Gall 398, Fed Cases 3, 776, p. 438.
"The civil law requires two witnesses to prove a sealed
instrument, whereas the common law requires but one."  Howe v.
Nappier, 4 Burrows, 1944; Menetone v. Gibbons, 3 Term R. 267; Smart
v. Wolff, Id. 323; and Buller, J., Id. 348."  De Lovio v. Boit et
al., 2 Gall 398, Fed Cases 3, 776, p. 438. (1815)
"The civil law never requires two witnesses, for indeed any
witness, unless the execution of the deed is denied by the party on
oath, which rarely can happen.	In this respect it holds the
chancery rule, that if any fact be denied in the defendant's answer
on oath, his denial shall prevail, unless disproved by two
witnesses, or one witness, and very strong corroborative
circumstances."  De Lovio v. Boit et al., 2 Gall 398, Fed. Cases 3,
776, p. 438. (1815)
"... the delegation of cognizance of 'all civil cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' to the courts of the United
States comprehends all maritime contracts, torts and injuries.	The
latter branch is necessarily bounded by the locality; the former
extends over all contracts (wheresoever they may be made or
executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations) which
relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea."  De
Lovio v. Boit et al., 2 Gall 398, Fed Cases 3, 776, p. 444 (1815)
"There is no more reason why the admiralty should have
cognizance of bottomery instruments, as maritime contracts, than of
policies of insurance.	Both are executed on land, and both
intrinsically respect maritime risks, injuries, and losses."
(Commerce) Be Lovio v. Boit et al., 2 Gall 398, Fed Cases 3, 776,
p. 444 (1815)
"...policies of insurance are within (though not exclusively
within) the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States." (Commerce) De Lovio v. Boit el al., 2 Gall 398, Fed Cases
3, 776, (1815)
Insurance is interstate commerce within the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution, article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
(Civil law)  United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n et
al., 322 U.S. 533 (1944)
Commerce includes trade, that is, business in which persons
bought and sold, bargained and contracted, including the business
of insurance.  (Civil Law)  United States v. Southeastern
Underwriters Ass'n et al., 322 U.S. 533 (1944)
The admiralty from the highest antiquity has exercised a very
extensive criminal jurisdiction.  United States v. Flores, 289 U.S.
137, 139. (1933)
Admiralty courts have a jurisdiction over contracts and torts
and other special cases.  (Commerce) Waring v. Clark, 5 How. 441,
454-464;  Genesse Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 , 454.  United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 142. (1933)
The criminal jurisdiction of the United States is wholly
statutory, see United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32,... United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 154. (1933)
"It is true that the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States is in general based on the territorial principle,
(commerce) and criminal statutes of the United States are not by
implication given an extra-territorial effect.	United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98; compare Blackmd States, 284 U.S. 421."
United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933).
It is natural to consider the vessels of a nation as parts of
its territory, though at sea, as the State retains its jurisdiction
over them.  This is the doctrine of the law of nations.
(Admiralty)  United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 156 n. 9. 9
The common law, as it was received in the United States at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, did not afford a remedy
in rem in suits between private persons.  Hence the adoption of the
savings clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  C.J. Hendry Co. et
al. v. Moors et al., 318 U.S. 133, 135 (1942)
There is an important exception to the general rule that a
judgement in rem was not a common law remedy.  Forfeiture to the
Crown of the offending object, because it had been used in
violation of law, by a procedure in rem was a practice familiar not
only to the English admiralty courts but to the court of Exchequer.
The Exchequer gave such a remedy for the forfeiture of articles
seized on land for the violation of law.  And, concurrently with
the admiralty, it entertained true proceedings in rem for the
forfeiture of vessels for violations on navigable waters.  C.J.
Hendry Co. et al. v. Moors et al., 318 U.S. 133, 137 (1942)
Under the provisions of many statutes the suit might be
brought by an informer gui tam, who was permitted to share in the
proceeds of the forfeited article; the judgement was of forfeiture
and the forfeited article was ordered to be sold.  (Commerce,
Admiralty)  C.J. Hendry Co. et al. v. Moore et al., 318 U.S. 133,
137-8 (1942)  (Is this how towing companies combine with the state
to confiscate vehicles on the roads; and using a forfeiture
statutes sell or otherwise dispose of them at a gain to the state
and the towing company)
Separate courts exercising the jurisdiction of the Court of
Exchequer were never established in the American Colonies.
Instead, that jurisdiction was absorbed by the common law courts
which entertained suits for the forfeiture of property under
English or local statutes authorizing its condemnation.
By 1700, the jurisdiction of the common law courts to condemn
ships and cargos for violation of the Navigation Acts had been
firmly established.
In general the suits were brought against the vessel or
article to be condemned, were tried by jury, closely followed the
procedure in Exchequer, and if successful resulted in judgements of
forfeiture of condemnation with a provision for sale.  (Commerce,
Admiralty)  C. J. Hendry Co. et al. v. Moore et al., 318 U.S. 133,
139-40 (1942)
It is noteworthy that Blackstone's commentaries, more read in
America before the Revolution than any other law book, referred to
the information in rem in the Court of exchequer as the procedure
by which forfeitures were inflicted for violation of Acts of
Parliament.  Bk. III, p. 262.  And Kent, in his commentaries,
pointed out that 'seizures, in England, for violation of the laws
of revenue, trade or navigation, were tried by a jury in the Court
of Exchequer, according to the course of the common law; and
through a proceeding be in rem, it is not necessarily a proceeding
or cause in the admiralty' (12th ed., Vol. 1, p. 374).  He declared
that, within the meaning of Section 9 of the Judiciary Act, the
common law was competent to give such a remedy 'because, under the
vigorous system of the English law, such prosecutions in rem are in
the Exchequer, according to the course of the common law' (p. 376).
(commerce)  C.J. Hendry Co. et al. v. Moore et al., 318 U.S. 133,
151-2 (1942)
"The trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all
causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
in a forfeiture case is exclusive, and it has repeatedly declared
that, in cases of forfeiture of articles seized on land for
violation of federal statutes, the district court proceeds as
courts of common law according to the course of Exchequer on
information in rem with trial by jury  (Commerce) The Sarah, 8
Wheat. 391, 396, n. A; 443 Cans of Egg Product v.
United States, 226 U.S. 172, and cases cited."  C. J. Hendry Co. et
al. v. Moore et al., 318 U.S. 133, 153 (1942)
"We conclude that the common law, as received in this country
at the time of the adoption of the constitution, gave a remedy in
rem in cases of forfeiture, and that it is a 'common law remedy'
and one which 'the common law is competent to give' within the
meaning of Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  By that Act the
states were left free to provide such a remedy in forfeiture cases
where the articles seized upon navigable waters of the state for
violation of state law."  (Admiralty, Commerce) C. J. Hendry Co. et
al. v. Moore et al.,  318 U.S. 133, 153 (1942)
There must be uniformity in maritime law; the principles of
maritime laws are applicable to commercial law, and therefore,
there must be uniformity in the commercial law.  Swift v. Tyson, 16
Pet 1, (1842)
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) has no application
outside of diversity cases.  (Admiralty, Commerce)  D'Onech, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 467.  (1942)
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) rests solely upon
the principle that state courts should have the power to determine
the scope and effectiveness of rights created by the states in the
exercise of their Constitutional power.
The "distinction between rights and remedies is fundamental."
Chelentis v. Luckenbach, S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918)
The rights enforceable under the "savings clause" include not
only those rights which arise from the general maritime law known
to the framers of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act, but also
any new rights created by the Federal Government which are amenable
to the remedies of the common law.  Panama R.R. v. Vasquez, 271
U.S. 557, 561 (1926)
The instance court is the ordinary and appropriate court of
admiralty, and takes cognizance of the general subjects of
admiralty jurisdiction, and it proceeds according to the civil and
maritime law.  The prize court has exclusive cognizance of
matters of prize and matters incidental thereto, and it proceeds to
hear and determine according to the course of admiralty and the law
of nations.  Kent's Commentaries, Lecture XVII
This commentary explains that there are two separate
jurisdiction in admiralty:  1) instance court, and 2) prize court,
and this was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme court when they ruled
that the district courts of the United States possess all of the
powers of courts of admiralty, whether considered as instance or as
prize courts.  The Sloop Betsy, 3 Dal 6.
It is certain, however, that the state courts take an
extensive and unquestioned cognizance of maritime contracts, and on
the ground that they are not cases, strictly and technically
Commentaries, Lecture XVII
Informations are filed in the court of exchequer for
forfeiture, upon seizure of property, for breach of laws of
revenue, impost, navigation, and trade.  (Admiralty, Commerce)
Kent's Commentaries, Lecture XVII
The Constitution secures to the citizen trial by jury, in all
criminal prosecutions, and in all civil suits at common law, where
the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.  These
prosecutions for forfeitures of large and valuable portions of
property under revenue and navigation laws are highly penal in
their consequences, and the government and its officers are always
parties, and deeply concerned in the conviction and forfeiture.
Kent's Commentaries, Lecture XVII (Admiralty)

Back to Top


Hit Counter

Home Courts SecretPolice FelonyForgiveness Vindictive Servants Victims Lawyers Personal Protection SecretTribunals Solutions
Last modified: 09/01/09.